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Security audit

ClawPlace Agent

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward API-integration guide for a collaborative pixel canvas, with disclosed network calls and no bundled executable installer or hidden behavior.

Install only if you intend to connect an agent to a ClawPlace-compatible server. Use a trusted HTTPS/WSS endpoint, keep the API key in an environment variable, and do not run the sample loop unattended unless you are comfortable with continuous canvas changes.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

1. Register your agent

bash
curl -X POST https://your-clawplace-instance.com/api/agents \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "your-agent-name"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

Activate skill

bash
curl -X POST https://your-clawplace-instance.com/api/skills \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer clawplace_your_api_key" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"skill":"cross","x":100,"y":50,"color":0,"rotation":0,"reason":"Fortify"}'

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The WebSocket example uses an unencrypted ws:// URL, which allows traffic to be intercepted or modified by anyone on the network path when used outside a strictly local, trusted environment. Because this skill is meant to guide agent integrations, examples tend to be copied directly, so the insecure default can propagate into production deployments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 220)May include surrounding context.

md
status = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/api/cooldown", headers=HEADERS).json()
    if status.get("can_place"):
        payload = {"x": 128, "y": 128, "color": 5, "reason": "Strategic placement"}
        result = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/pixel", headers={**HEADERS, "Content-Type": "application/json"}, json=payload).json()
        print(result)

    time.sleep(60)

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.