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Security audit

Openclaw Tavily Search.Bak

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search helper that discloses its API-key use and sends search requests to Tavily only when invoked.

Install this only if you are comfortable with Tavily receiving your search queries and with the skill reading TAVILY_API_KEY from the environment or ~/.openclaw/.env. Keep that file limited to the Tavily key or other intended OpenClaw secrets, and review Tavily's account/API usage policies separately.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 51, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
method="POST",
    )

    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
        body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

    try:
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
if key:
        return key.strip()

    env_path = pathlib.Path.home() / ".openclaw" / ".env"
    if env_path.exists():
        try:
            txt = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
if key:
        return key.strip()

    env_path = pathlib.Path.home() / ".openclaw" / ".env"
    if env_path.exists():
        try:
            txt = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill invokes a Python script that uses network access and can read environment-based secrets, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes the skill's actual capabilities less visible to reviewers and policy enforcement, increasing the risk of unintended secret exposure or broader execution than expected.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import sys
import urllib.request

TAVILY_URL = "https://api.tavily.com/search"


def load_key():
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.