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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill mostly does what it says, but its AI mode can automatically send scripts and API credentials to environment-selected endpoints without enough disclosure or control.

Review this skill before installing if your scripts are private or your LLM API keys are valuable. Use it only in an environment where provider base URL variables are trusted, avoid running the connection test in shared logs, and assume AI mode may send the complete script to the configured external provider. Local fallback behavior appears non-persistent and non-destructive.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
bundle-en.js:153
Finding

Mandatory Promotional Content Injected into Every Analysis Report

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
bundle-en.js:26
Finding

Environment-Controlled API Base URLs Can Exfiltrate API Keys and Script Contents

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
bundle-en.js:494
Finding

Connection Test Discloses API Key Prefix in Console Logs

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
### ✅ **Auto AI — Zero Config**
- **Reads OpenClaw config** automatically (env vars (DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, etc.))
- **Uses your current AI model** (DeepSeek / OpenAI / Anthropic / Google)
- **No .env file needed** — just run it

### ✅ **Smart Fallback**
- **AI unavailable?** Falls back to local analysis engine

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill states it will read OpenClaw config and use configured AI providers, but it does not clearly disclose that user-supplied script content may be transmitted to third-party model APIs. This creates a real privacy and data-handling risk, especially if users analyze sensitive or unpublished content under the assumption processing is local unless explicitly told otherwise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

🔧 Configuring OpenClaw for AI

If you haven't set up OpenClaw yet, create ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json:

json
{

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The inline comment says 'Env vars only — no filesystem access for ClawHub compliance,' which actively suggests the skill does not access the filesystem. However, the CLI later checks for file existence and reads the script from disk using fs.existsSync and fs.readFileSync, so the documentation contradicts actual behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bundle-en.js (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

js
return {
      modelName: process.env.OPENAI_MODEL || 'gpt-4o-mini',
      apiKey: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY,
      baseURL: process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL || 'https://api.openai.com/v1',
      provider: 'openai',
      fullName: 'openai/gpt-4o-mini',
    };

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The system prompt instructs the model to 'output a structured English report,' which imposes a fixed language behavior. The file also brands itself as an 'English Edition', but does not offer user opt-in or a configurable language option, making this a natural-language locale policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

When API credentials are present, the tool sends the full script content to third-party AI providers without an explicit runtime warning or consent prompt. This can expose sensitive or proprietary material to external services unexpectedly, especially because the fallback/local behavior may lead users to assume analysis is always local.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · github-issue.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
### What the skill actually does

1. **Reads `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`** — a user-owned local config file via `fs.readFileSync`. This is equivalent to reading `~/.bashrc` or any other user-level config. No write operations.

2. **Calls external LLM APIs** (DeepSeek / OpenAI / Anthropic / Google) via `fetch()` — standard HTTPS calls to public API endpoints. User provides their own API key via the config file.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The file explicitly states that all prompts and outputs are in English, and the description repeatedly brands the skill as an English edition. This is a natural-language policy concern because it fixes the interaction language without offering the user a choice or documenting an opt-in mechanism.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.