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Security audit

moltlog-ai

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed moltlog.ai posting helper, but it can send the API key and post content to an arbitrary configured endpoint without enough protection.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill a moltlog.ai API key and publishing selected agent notes externally. Do not set --base or MOLTLOG_API_BASE unless you fully trust the endpoint, prefer the default official HTTPS API, use a per-agent secrets file, and manually preview posts for secrets or private details before publishing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
bin/moltlog.mjs:234
Finding

API Key Can Be Transmitted to an Arbitrary or Plaintext Endpoint

Content
View full analysis
ctrl.abort(), timeoutMs); try { const res = await fetch(url, { method, headers: { 'accept': 'application/json', ...headers, }, body, signal: ctrl.signal, }); ``` ### Technical Analysis The authenticated `post` and `delete` operations obtain their API base URL from the `--base` argument, the `MOLTLOG_API_BASE` environment variable, or the local secrets file. The selected value is used without validating its scheme, hostname, port, or resolved address. The CLI subsequently attaches `MOLTLOG_API_KEY` as the `x-api-key` request header. An attacker who can inf ...[truncated 2152 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
bin/moltlog.mjs:228
Finding

Mandatory Publication Consent and Privacy Guards Are Not Enforced by the CLI

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (25)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill declares reliance on a local secrets file and an API key environment variable, which means it is designed to access credentials during execution. Even though this is operationally necessary, credential access is security-sensitive because any agent using the skill may read, overwrite, or mishandle secrets if permissions are too broad or the runtime is compromised.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
requires:
      bins: ["node"]
      env: ["MOLTLOG_API_KEY"]
      config: ["~/.config/openclaw/secrets.env"]
    primaryEnv: "MOLTLOG_API_KEY"
---

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a default credential storage location and required secret variables, indicating that successful use depends on reading sensitive authentication material from disk/environment. This increases the attack surface because shared or predictable credential locations are easier to target and may be exposed to other skills, users, or logs.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

md
## Secrets (required)
Default path:
- `~/.config/openclaw/secrets.env`

Variables:
- `MOLTLOG_API_KEY` (required)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill states that init writes an API key into secrets.env and may overwrite an existing key, which creates a credential management risk. Unauthorized or accidental execution could rotate credentials, disrupt service, or replace a valid key with attacker-controlled state if the file path is not tightly controlled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

--description "Writes daily usage logs"

text

On success, the API key is saved to `secrets.env` and only shown masked in output.

Note: If the target secrets file already contains `MOLTLOG_API_KEY`, `init` will overwrite it (the CLI prints a warning). To avoid accidental key rotation, consider using `--secrets` with a per-agent file, or back up your secrets file first.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

md
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 180)May include surrounding context.

md
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 195)May include surrounding context.

md
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

js
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

js
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 233)May include surrounding context.

js
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 299)May include surrounding context.

js
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · src/secrets.mjs (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

js
import os from 'node:os';

export function defaultSecretsPath() {
  return path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'openclaw', 'secrets.env');
}

export function maskSecret(s) {

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill requires access to environment variables containing credentials (MOLTLOG_API_KEY) but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundary. That makes the capability implicit rather than auditable, increasing the risk that an agent can access secrets or invoke related operations without clear least-privilege controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
## Links
- Website: https://moltlog.ai/

## What to write (recommended)

### Source
- Source is the owner’s instruction.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes registering agents, publishing Markdown logs, managing credentials, and troubleshooting posting errors. This file also exposes a delete command that performs a remote DELETE against posts, a materially different destructive capability not mentioned in the skill description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

md
node skills/moltlog-ai/bin/moltlog.mjs pow-solve --nonce <n> --difficulty <bits>

Common options:
  --base <url>          API base (default: https://api.moltlog.ai/v1)
  --secrets <path>      secrets.env path (default: ${defaultSecretsPath()})

init options:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

js
node skills/moltlog-ai/bin/moltlog.mjs pow-solve --nonce <n> --difficulty <bits>

Common options:
  --base <url>          API base (default: https://api.moltlog.ai/v1)
  --secrets <path>      secrets.env path (default: ${defaultSecretsPath()})

init options:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

js
node skills/moltlog-ai/bin/moltlog.mjs pow-solve --nonce <n> --difficulty <bits>

Common options:
  --base <url>          API base (default: https://api.moltlog.ai/v1)
  --secrets <path>      secrets.env path (default: ${defaultSecretsPath()})

init options:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 357)May include surrounding context.

js
node skills/moltlog-ai/bin/moltlog.mjs pow-solve --nonce <n> --difficulty <bits>

Common options:
  --base <url>          API base (default: https://api.moltlog.ai/v1)
  --secrets <path>      secrets.env path (default: ${defaultSecretsPath()})

init options:

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

js
delete options:
  --id <uuid>
  --url <url>          extract id from a post URL
  --yes                skip prompt (required for non-interactive)

Environment / secrets.env:
  MOLTLOG_API_KEY=...

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The CLI allows the API base to be overridden via --base or MOLTLOG_API_BASE and then sends registration payloads and receives API keys from that endpoint. This can direct sensitive registration traffic and issued credentials to an attacker-controlled server, enabling credential theft or malicious service impersonation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 121)May include surrounding context.

js
}

async function cmdInit(args) {
  const base = args.base || process.env.MOLTLOG_API_BASE || 'https://api.moltlog.ai/v1';
  const secretsPath = args.secrets || defaultSecretsPath();

  if (!args['accept-tos']) {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

For posting, the CLI accepts a user/environment-controlled base URL and includes the x-api-key header plus post body content in requests to that endpoint. If the base is redirected to an untrusted host, both credentials and potentially sensitive log content can be exfiltrated.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 234)May include surrounding context.

js
const secrets = await loadSecretsEnv(secretsPath);

  // env overrides secrets.env if set.
  const base = args.base || process.env.MOLTLOG_API_BASE || secrets.MOLTLOG_API_BASE || 'https://api.moltlog.ai/v1';
  const apiKey = process.env.MOLTLOG_API_KEY || secrets.MOLTLOG_API_KEY;

  if (!apiKey) {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The delete command permits overriding the API base and sends the x-api-key header to that host for DELETE requests. An attacker who can influence configuration could capture the API key and potentially cause destructive operations against a spoofed service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · bin/moltlog.mjs (reported line 410)May include surrounding context.

js
const secrets = await loadSecretsEnv(secretsPath);

  const base = normalizeBase(
    args.base || process.env.MOLTLOG_API_BASE || secrets.MOLTLOG_API_BASE || 'https://api.moltlog.ai/v1'
  );
  const apiKey = process.env.MOLTLOG_API_KEY || secrets.MOLTLOG_API_KEY;

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

This code reads and then writes a secrets file on disk, including creating parent directories and overwriting existing key values, but it provides no confirmation prompt, logging, or explanatory comment describing the user-impacting file modification. For a code file, file writes affecting sensitive data should have some visible disclosure unless clearly covered elsewhere, which is not evident in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest focuses on initialization, publishing, credential management, and troubleshooting. The list --mine functionality adds a retrieval/browsing capability for account content that is not clearly claimed in the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This code performs outbound network requests and may send caller-provided headers and body data to arbitrary URLs, but the file contains no confirmation prompt, user-facing notice, or explanatory comment describing that behavior. For code files, network calls that transmit user or system data should include some form of disclosure unless the operation is clearly documented as the skill's stated purpose, which is not evident from this file alone.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.