Back to skill

Security audit

AuditClaw Azure

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Azure compliance scanner that uses read-only Azure access and stores results locally, with some operational risks users should manage.

Install only if you are comfortable granting a scanner identity read-only visibility into the target Azure subscription and storing compliance findings in the local shared GRC database. Prefer a dedicated service principal, protect and rotate AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET, scope access as narrowly as your audit needs allow, and review the known evidence-quality limitations before relying on results for formal assurance.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:90
Finding

Subscription-Wide Azure Roles Exceed the Minimum Permissions Required

Content
View full analysis
### Step 2: Add Security Reader Role az role assignment create --assignee --role "Security Reader" --scope /subscriptions/ ``` The corresponding role configuration is: ```json { "role": "Reader", "scope": "Subscription", "reason": "Read access to all resource configurations (storage, compute, network, SQL, App Service)", "built_in_id": "acdd72a7-3385-48ef-bd42-f606fba81ae7" }, { "role": "Security Reader", "scope": "Subscription", "reason": "Read access to Microsoft Defender for Cloud status and security recommendations", "built_in_id": "39bc4728-0917-49c7-9d2c-d95423bc2eb4" } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill performs a limited set of configuration checks against Storage, Network Security Groups, Key Vault, SQL, Compute, App Service, and Defender pricing information. However, its setup instructions grant the built-in **Reader** and **Security Reader** roles across the entire subscription. These built-in roles provide visibility beyond the exact management-plane read operations used by the twelve declared checks. In particular, the policy states that Security Reader permits access to security recommendations, while the implementation only queries Defender pricing tiers. The behavior is read-only and does not permit direct Azure resource modification, but it violates least privilege by allowing broad subscription reconnaissance if the scanner identity is compromised. ### Attack Path 1. An operator follows the documented setup and grants Reader and Security Reader at subscription scope. 2. The service-principal client secret is exposed through an unrelated ...[truncated 940 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/checks/network.py:54
Finding

NSG Analysis Can Miss Public SSH and RDP Rules Using Plural Prefix or Port Fields

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/azure_evidence.py:247
Finding

Azure Connection Test Reports Unexpected Exceptions as Successful Access

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (11)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest says the skill provides '12 read-only checks' for Azure evidence collection, which implies assessment-oriented behavior against Azure resources. However, this file also inserts evidence records and updates integration status in a local GRC database via add-evidence, INSERT, and UPDATE operations. Those write-side effects go beyond a plain read-only checking role as described.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises executable behavior and relies on environment variables and shell/Python execution, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. That creates an authorization and transparency gap: a host agent or user may not understand that command execution and secret-bearing environment access are required, increasing the risk of unintended shell use or exposure of Azure credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This manifest lists sensitive authentication material including AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET, but provides no warning about secure storage, exposure risk, or precautions when using these credentials. Because manifest files are in scope for SQP-2 only when they are markdown files, this finding is based on the adjacent operational guidance nature of the file combined with explicit credential disclosure expectations in the content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/azure_evidence.py (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

python
"--file-content", json.dumps(result, default=str),
    ]

    proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if proc.returncode != 0:
        return _store_evidence_direct(db_path, check_name, result)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This code stores Azure compliance results as evidence, and the stored payload includes serialized check output via store_evidence, which can contain cloud inventory or configuration data. Although the module docstring states that results are stored, there is no confirmation prompt or nearby user-facing disclosure at the point of collection and persistence in the execution flow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill states that collected compliance evidence is persisted to a shared local SQLite database, but it does not prominently warn users about local data retention, cross-skill sharing, or the sensitivity of stored cloud security metadata. Even if the data is read-only evidence, it can still reveal security posture, resource names, misconfigurations, and audit details that another local process or skill could access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The test_connection routine actively connects to Azure Resource Manager and several service APIs to enumerate accessibility, which is a network operation involving account and subscription context. While the function name suggests connectivity testing, the code lacks an explicit runtime disclosure that it will contact multiple Azure services and attempt listing operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/azure_evidence.py (reported line 239)May include surrounding context.

python
for service_name, (module_path, class_name, prop_name, method_name) in service_probes.items():
        try:
            mod = importlib.import_module(module_path)
            client_class = getattr(mod, class_name)
            client = client_class(credential, subscription_id)
            prop = getattr(client, prop_name)
            method = getattr(prop, method_name)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/azure_evidence.py (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

python
mod = importlib.import_module(module_path)
            client_class = getattr(mod, class_name)
            client = client_class(credential, subscription_id)
            prop = getattr(client, prop_name)
            method = getattr(prop, method_name)
            list(method())  # Force execution
            results.append({"service": service_name, "status": "ok", "detail": "accessible"})

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/azure_evidence.py (reported line 242)May include surrounding context.

python
client_class = getattr(mod, class_name)
            client = client_class(credential, subscription_id)
            prop = getattr(client, prop_name)
            method = getattr(prop, method_name)
            list(method())  # Force execution
            results.append({"service": service_name, "status": "ok", "detail": "accessible"})
            passed += 1

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This code instantiates an Azure Compute client and lists all virtual machines in the subscription, which is a network/API operation involving access to cloud resource metadata. While the docstring describes the check's purpose, there is no user-facing warning, confirmation, logging, or explicit disclosure in this file that it will query the Azure subscription.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.