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Security audit

mealie-recipe-import

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Mealie recipe importer, but it handles a long-lived API token in a way that can expose it if users follow the documented HTTP configuration.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill a Mealie API token that can create and modify recipe data. Use HTTPS for MEALIE_URL, prefer a dedicated revocable token with the least permissions available, avoid exposing the token in shared logs or shell history, and rotate any token previously used over plaintext HTTP.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/mealie_import.py:30
Finding

Long-Lived API Token Can Be Exposed Through Plaintext HTTP and Unvalidated Redirects

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Tainted flow: 'r' from os.environ.get (line 78, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mealie_import.py (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

python
h["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
    r = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path, data=body, headers=h, method=method)
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=90) as resp:
            raw = resp.read().decode()
            return json.loads(raw) if raw.strip() else None
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:

Tainted flow: 'r' from os.environ.get (line 78, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mealie_import.py (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

python
h["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
    r = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path, data=body, headers=h, method=method)
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=90) as resp:
            raw = resp.read().decode()
            return json.loads(raw) if raw.strip() else None
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior says the skill imports recipes from photo, text, or URL, but the described implementation actually depends on pre-structured JSON input and also creates foods and units in Mealie. This mismatch can mislead operators about what the skill will do and what permissions or data modifications it requires, which is dangerous because hidden write behavior can expand impact on a production Mealie instance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill requires access to environment variables and makes authenticated network requests, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That weakens least-privilege controls and can cause the agent runtime to grant broader capabilities than users expect, increasing the chance of unintended secret access or outbound requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.