T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:18- Finding
API Key and Sensitive Data Exfiltration Through an Unrestricted API Host Override
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent Karma funding-program manager, but it handles high-impact admin and payout actions with persistent plaintext credentials and an unrestricted API host override.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Only use it with a Karma API key you are willing to grant to the agent, avoid setting KARMA_API_URL unless you fully trust the endpoint, prefer session-only credentials or secure secret storage, and manually confirm approvals, payouts, reviewer changes, agreement signatures, and AI evaluation submissions before they are sent.
SKILL.md:18API Key and Sensitive Data Exfiltration Through an Unrestricted API Host Override
SKILL.md:66Karma API Key Stored in Plaintext Without Restrictive File Permissions
The skill directs writing an API key into a local credentials.json file, which is a credential materialization and persistence action with significant exposure risk. If the file is readable by other processes, included in backups, synced, or mishandled by surrounding tooling, the key could be stolen and used to administer programs, view application data, and perform privileged operations.
mkdir -p "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}"
echo '{"apiKey": "karma_..."}' > "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}/credentials.json"
export KARMA_API_KEY="karma_..."
The trigger phrase "or any funding program administration action" is overly broad and can cause the skill to activate for a wide range of ambiguous requests. In a high-privilege admin skill that can create programs, approve applications, and disburse funds, over-triggering increases the chance of unintended sensitive actions being proposed or initiated in the wrong context.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s -X POST "${BASE_URL}/v2/agent/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0" \
-d '{}'
The skill instructs automatic persistence of an API key into plugin storage or shell startup files, which creates long-lived credentials on disk and modifies user configuration. This is dangerous because it increases the exposure window for credential theft, can leak to other local processes or users, and performs persistent system changes without a strong explicit consent/warning step.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s "${BASE_URL}/v2/agent/info" \
-H "x-api-key: ${KARMA_API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
After the program exists in the registry, create its funding configuration to enable application management.
curl -s -X POST "${BASE_URL}/v2/funding-program-configs/${PROGRAM_ID}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0" \
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Define the fields applicants must fill out. The form must contain at least one email field.
curl -s -X PUT "${BASE_URL}/v2/funding-program-configs/${PROGRAM_ID}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0" \
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s "${BASE_URL}/v2/funding-program-configs/${PROGRAM_ID}" \
-H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s "${BASE_URL}/v2/funding-applications/${REFERENCE_NUMBER}" \
-H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0"
The application workflow collects applicant email and detailed application contents, then sends them to remote APIs and potentially to AI evaluation endpoints, but does not require a clear user-facing disclosure before transmission. This creates privacy and consent risk because users may reveal personal or sensitive project information without understanding that it will be processed remotely and reused for evaluation.
This endpoint transmits user-provided application answers to a remote AI evaluation service, potentially including personal and sensitive project information, without a mandatory explicit consent step in the flow. Because the skill invites users to submit free-form content for scoring, the privacy impact is materially higher than a generic API call and can expose confidential information to automated processing.
If enabled, call the evaluate-realtime endpoint with the user's answers:
curl -s -X POST "${BASE_URL}/v2/funding-applications/${PROGRAM_ID}/evaluate-realtime" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0" \
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s "${BASE_URL}/v2/funding-program-configs/${PROGRAM_ID}/reviewers" \
-H "x-api-key: ${API_KEY}" \
-H "X-Source: skill:funding-program-manager" -H "X-Invocation-Id: $INVOCATION_ID" -H "X-Skill-Version: 1.0.0"