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Security audit

Personal Client Management System & Finance System

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches its stated purpose, but it handles a powerful account API key in ways that could expose it if misconfigured or run in a shared environment.

Install only if you trust the OurProject service and understand the API key's scope. Use the default HTTPS API URL, avoid custom or HTTP endpoints, keep the skill directory out of shared repos and backups, restrict .config.json permissions, and rotate the API key if it may have appeared in logs or been stored insecurely.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/setup.js:18
Finding

Bearer API Credentials Can Be Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
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{ const url = new URL(apiUrl + '/integrations/me'); const isHttps = url.protocol === 'https:'; const lib = isHttps ? https : http; const options = { hostname: url.hostname, port: url.port || (isHttps ? 443 : 80), path: url.pathname, method: 'GET', headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${apiKey}`, 'User-Agent': 'OurProject-OpenClaw-Skill/1.0' }, }; ``` ```js // API URL const apiUrl = await ask(`API URL [${DEFAULT_API_URL}]: `); const finalApiUrl = apiUrl.trim() || (existingConfig?.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_API_URL); // API Key const apiKey = await ask('API Key (starts with op_): '); if (!apiKey.trim()) { console.error('❌ API key is required. Get one from Integrations → API Keys.'); rl.close(); process.exit(1); } if (!apiKey.trim().startsWith('op_')) { console.error('❌ Invalid API key format. Must start with "op_"'); rl.close(); process.exit(1); } // Test connection console.log('\n🔍 Testing connection...'); try { const result = await testApiKey(finalApiUrl, apiKey.trim()); ``` ```js function makeRequest(method, endpoint, body = null) { const config = loadConfig(); return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const baseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || 'https://api.ourproject.app/api'; // Normalize: if endpoint already has /api/ prefix, strip it since baseUrl already includes /api const normalizedEndpoint = endpoint.startsWith('/api/') ? endpoint.slice(4) : endpoint; const fullEndpoint = normalizedEndpoint.startsWith('/') ? normalizedEndpoi ...[truncated 2716 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/setup.js:97
Finding

API Key and Personal Information Are Stored without Explicit Restrictive File Permissions

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/test.js:11
Finding

Connection Test Exposes a Substantial API-Key Prefix in Logs

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (17)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/projects.js` | List all projects |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/projects.js` | List all projects |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/deadlines.js [days]` | Tasks with deadlines (default: 3 days) |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/deadlines.js [days]` | Tasks with deadlines (default: 3 days) |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/bills.js [days]` | Upcoming bills (default: 7 days) |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/bills.js [days]` | Upcoming bills (default: 7 days) |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/finance.js` | Finance overview |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

md
| `node scripts/finance.js` | Finance overview |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/api.js (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

js
const https = require('https');

const CONFIG_FILE = path.join(__dirname, '..', '.config.json');
const DEFAULT_API_URL = 'https://api.ourproject.app/api';

const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
const ask = (q) => new Promise(resolve => rl.question(q, resolve));

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/setup.js (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

js
const https = require('https');

const CONFIG_FILE = path.join(__dirname, '..', '.config.json');
const DEFAULT_API_URL = 'https://api.ourproject.app/api';

const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
const ask = (q) => new Promise(resolve => rl.question(q, resolve));

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The script prints a portion of the API key to console output (config.apiKey.slice(0, 11)), which leaks sensitive credential material into terminal history, CI logs, screen recordings, or shared debugging output. Even partial secret disclosure is unsafe because it aids secret identification, correlation across systems, and may expose enough of the token format or prefix to assist further compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The markdown says users can 'ask your OpenClaw agent things like' followed by broad natural-language examples such as 'Give me a daily summary' and 'Any unread notifications?'. It does not define clear trigger boundaries, exclusions, or negative examples, so these phrases could overlap with ordinary conversation and lead to unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The section maps generic user utterances like 'Any notifications?' and 'Give me today's summary' to skill actions, but does not specify that these only apply in the context of ourproject.app data. Because the trigger wording is not domain-specific and lacks disambiguation, it risks accidental activation during unrelated conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The function formats currency using toLocaleString('id-ID'), which forces a specific locale in user-facing output. The file does not offer any user opt-in or explain that this skill is intentionally region-specific, so it appears to violate the language/locale policy for natural-language behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This code makes HTTP requests to notification endpoints, which necessarily transmit authentication context and retrieve user-associated data. Although the file has a brief header comment and prints results, it does not disclose that it will contact a remote service or access notification data, which is the kind of behavior SQP-2 asks to warn about for code files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code formats dates with toLocaleString('en-US'), which hard-codes a specific language/locale choice. Under SQP-3, forcing a locale without user choice or documented justification is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The summary date is always formatted with the 'en-US' locale via toLocaleDateString, which forces English-language output regardless of user preference. This is a natural-language policy concern because the file does not offer a locale choice or explain why English is required.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.