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Security audit

Feishu Meeting

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Feishu meeting skill does what it says, but its shell script can turn meeting input into local Python code execution and uses broad calendar-writing authority.

Review before installing. Use only with a least-privilege Feishu app and an unprivileged runtime account, and do not pass untrusted meeting titles, recurrence rules, or start times until the script is fixed to pass data into Python via arguments or stdin. Add an explicit confirmation step before creating events or sending invitee phone/email data to Feishu.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/create.sh:69
Finding

Arbitrary Python Code Execution Through Unsafe Variable Interpolation

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null || python3 -c " from datetime import datetime print(int(datetime.strptime('$START_TIME', '%Y-%m-%d %H:%M').timestamp())) ") ``` #### Meeting topic and recurrence-rule interpolation at lines 82–95 ```bash EVENT_JSON=$(python3 -c " import json event = { 'summary': '''$MEETING_TOPIC''', 'start_time': {'timestamp': '$START_TS', 'timezone': 'Asia/Shanghai'}, 'end_time': {'timestamp': '$END_TS', 'timezone': 'Asia/Shanghai'}, 'vchat': {'vc_type': 'vc'}, 'attendee_ability': 'can_see_others' } rrule = '''$RRULE''' if rrule: r = rrule.replace('RRULE:', '') if 'COUNT' not in r and 'UNTIL' not in r: r += ';COUNT=52' event['recurrence'] = r print(json.dumps(event, ensure_ascii=False)) ") ``` #### Owner and resolved identifier interpolation at lines 146–151 ```bash ATTENDEES_JSON=$(python3 -c " import json owner = '$DEFAULT_OWNER_OPEN_ID' extras = [x for x in '$EXTRA_OPEN_IDS'.split(',') if x] all_ids = list(dict.fromkeys([owner] + extras)) print(json.dumps({'attendees': [{'type':'user','user_id':uid} for uid in all_ids]})) ") ``` ### Technical Analysis The script constructs Python programs using `python3 -c` and directly inserts shell-variable contents into the Python source. These values are not encoded as Python string literals and are not passed through a structured interface such as command-line arguments or standard input. The following values reach generated Python source: - `START_TIME`, supplied through `--start` - `MEETING_TOPIC`, supplied as the first positional argument - `RRULE`, supplied through `--rrule` - `DEFAULT_OWNER_OPEN_ID`, obtained from configuration - `EXTRA_OPEN_IDS`, derived from the Feishu API res ...[truncated 2486 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (13)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

bash
# After configuring Feishu appId/appSecret in openclaw.json:
curl -s "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
for c in json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['calendar_list']:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
73% confidence
Finding

The script directly accesses long-lived application credentials from a local file and uses them to mint a tenant access token without any guardrails around secret storage, permission checks, or execution context. In an agent-skill setting, this increases the blast radius if the skill is triggered in an untrusted or overly broad environment, because compromise of the host or misuse of the skill can leverage privileged API credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

sh
APP_ID=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('$CONFIG_FILE'))['channels']['feishu']['appId'])")
APP_SECRET=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('$CONFIG_FILE'))['channels']['feishu']['appSecret'])")

# --- Get Tenant Access Token ---
ACCESS_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/auth/v3/tenant_access_token/internal" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

sh
APP_SECRET=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('$CONFIG_FILE'))['channels']['feishu']['appSecret'])")

# --- Get Tenant Access Token ---
ACCESS_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/auth/v3/tenant_access_token/internal" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"app_id\":\"$APP_ID\",\"app_secret\":\"$APP_SECRET\"}" \

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

sh
")

# --- Step 1: Create Calendar Event ---
CREATE_RESP=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/${CALENDAR_ID}/events?user_id_type=open_id" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8" \

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 153)May include surrounding context.

sh
print(json.dumps({'attendees': [{'type':'user','user_id':uid} for uid in all_ids]}))
")

ATT_RESP=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/${CALENDAR_ID}/events/${EVENT_ID}/attendees?user_id_type=open_id" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8" \

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises operational behavior that clearly requires network and shell access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That weakens governance and review controls, making it easier for an agent runtime to grant broader capabilities than users or operators expect when the skill is invoked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The activation phrases are broad enough to match ordinary meeting or scheduling requests, which can cause the skill to trigger in situations where the user did not specifically intend Feishu calendar writes or external API use. In context, that increases the chance of unintended meeting creation, attendee resolution, and data transmission to Feishu.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill describes meeting creation convenience but does not clearly disclose that invitee phone numbers/emails and event metadata will be sent to Feishu APIs and written into participants' calendars. This is a privacy and consent issue because users may provide third-party identifiers without realizing the external transmission and side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The script accesses sensitive credentials by reading appId and appSecret from the OpenClaw config file. Although the header comments describe the skill purpose, there is no explicit warning, prompt, or user-facing notice that local credentials will be accessed during execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

sh
APP_SECRET=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('$CONFIG_FILE'))['channels']['feishu']['appSecret'])")

# --- Get Tenant Access Token ---
ACCESS_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/auth/v3/tenant_access_token/internal" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"app_id\":\"$APP_ID\",\"app_secret\":\"$APP_SECRET\"}" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

sh
")

# --- Step 1: Create Calendar Event ---
CREATE_RESP=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/${CALENDAR_ID}/events?user_id_type=open_id" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create.sh (reported line 153)May include surrounding context.

sh
print(json.dumps({'attendees': [{'type':'user','user_id':uid} for uid in all_ids]}))
")

ATT_RESP=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/${CALENDAR_ID}/events/${EVENT_ID}/attendees?user_id_type=open_id" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8" \

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script emits all user-facing success and status messages in Chinese only. This is a natural-language policy concern because it imposes a specific language without offering opt-in, fallback, or locale selection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.