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Security audit

ControlClaw firewall

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill suspicious because it reports repeated use of unpinned npm commands that can fetch and run changing code, including during privileged setup and pairing; no malicious intent is established.

Consider the unpinned package execution the main installation risk: even though the skill's purpose is firewall setup, fetched code may change and some commands may run with elevated privileges or handle a pairing code. The scan is marked partial because two local references could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete. The overall verdict is suspicious, not malicious.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (31)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

restarts at the end, then run, for proxy mode:

bash
{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; npx --yes controlclaw connect --mode proxy --firewall <address> --code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

For docker, host or remote, only with sudo and the person's yes:

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 154)May include surrounding context.

For docker, host or remote, only with sudo and the person's yes:

bash
{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw connect --mode <mode> --firewall <address> --code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

Without sudo, delete the file (rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code) and give the person

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 154)May include surrounding context.

For docker, host or remote, only with sudo and the person's yes:

bash
{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw connect --mode <mode> --firewall <address> --code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

Without sudo, delete the file (rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code) and give the person

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 157)May include surrounding context.

{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw connect --mode --firewall

--code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

text

Without sudo, delete the file (`rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code`) and give the person
`sudo npx controlclaw connect --mode <mode> --firewall <address>` to run themselves: it asks for the
code and doesn't show it. Never reuse a code. If `connect` fails, show its message and ask for a new
code before trying again.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx controlclaw'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Although this is a CLI rather than an MCP server, npx can fetch and execute an unpinned npm release. This installation command is intended for a Docker-capable or privileged host, so a compromised release could gain control of the host and firewall.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx controlclaw'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supposedly non-changing diagnostic command still executes npm package code without specifying a version. A compromised release could access the agent's files and credentials even though the intended doctor operation requires no root.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

md
- **You could undo it yourself.** If `doctor` warns that OpenClaw's user can use sudo, tell the person
  plainly: with sudo, you (or a prompt that tricks you) could remove the rules and reach the
  firewall's data. Taking sudo away from OpenClaw's user after the install closes that.
- **The docker group.** If OpenClaw's user is in `docker` (or `lxd`, `incus`, `libvirt`, `podman`),
  host mode refuses to run, because such a user can start a container that goes around the rules.
  Removing the user from the group (`sudo gpasswd -d <user> docker`) makes it possible.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

md
firewall's data. Taking sudo away from OpenClaw's user after the install closes that.
- **The docker group.** If OpenClaw's user is in `docker` (or `lxd`, `incus`, `libvirt`, `podman`),
  host mode refuses to run, because such a user can start a container that goes around the rules.
  Removing the user from the group (`sudo gpasswd -d <user> docker`) makes it possible.
- **Your model key.** A new firewall allows every site and logs it. If the person later sets **Every
  other site** to **Block**, a model key you hold yourself needs its host allowed in the panel
  (for example `api.openai.com`, `api.anthropic.com`), or you lose your model. A key they add in the

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

md
(for example `api.openai.com`, `api.anthropic.com`), or you lose your model. A key they add in the
  panel gets its rule by itself.

Ask for a yes, and whether you may use sudo. Run it yourself only if you can use sudo **and** they
said yes. Before you run it, tell them: "OpenClaw restarts now; I will be back in a minute." Keep the
output in a file, since you won't see its last lines:

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 151)May include surrounding context.

{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; npx --yes controlclaw connect --mode proxy --firewall

--code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

text

For `docker`, `host` or `remote`, only with sudo and the person's yes:

```bash
{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw connect --mode <mode> --firewall <address> --code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 113)May include surrounding context.

output in a file, since you won't see its last lines:

bash
sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw up --here 2>&1 | tee ~/controlclaw-up.log

Otherwise give them the same command to run in their own terminal (sudo npx controlclaw up --here).

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 154)May include surrounding context.

For docker, host or remote, only with sudo and the person's yes:

bash
{ rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code; sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw connect --mode <mode> --firewall <address> --code -; } < ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code

Without sudo, delete the file (rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code) and give the person

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

sudo "$(command -v npx)" --yes controlclaw up --here 2>&1 | tee ~/controlclaw-up.log

text

Otherwise give them the same command to run in their own terminal (`sudo npx controlclaw up --here`).

When you are back, read `~/controlclaw-up.log`, then run `sudo npx controlclaw status`. Every line
should start with ✓. Tell the person what it says, and go to step 6.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 158)May include surrounding context.

text

Without sudo, delete the file (`rm -f ~/.controlclaw-pairing/code`) and give the person
`sudo npx controlclaw connect --mode <mode> --firewall <address>` to run themselves: it asks for the
code and doesn't show it. Never reuse a code. If `connect` fails, show its message and ask for a new
code before trying again.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 171)May include surrounding context.

needs Docker, and its private address, the one the agents reach it at (never a public one):

bash
npx controlclaw install --listen <private-ip>     # a user in the docker group, or with sudo

It prints the pairing address and a first code. For each agent, the person makes a code in the panel

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 186)May include surrounding context.

The panel listens on the firewall machine's loopback (`). Get its link:

bash
npx controlclaw open      # with sudo if the firewall was installed with sudo

Until the person sets the panel's password, the link carries a one-time setup token: whoever opens it

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 186)May include surrounding context.

The panel listens on the firewall machine's loopback (`). Get its link:

bash
npx controlclaw open      # with sudo if the firewall was installed with sudo

Until the person sets the panel's password, the link carries a one-time setup token: whoever opens it

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx controlclaw'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The fallback command executes an unpinned npm package through sudo. User approval authorizes the installation but does not ensure that the package version fetched at execution time is trustworthy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

md
Otherwise give them the same command to run in their own terminal (`sudo npx controlclaw up --here`).

When you are back, read `~/controlclaw-up.log`, then run `sudo npx controlclaw status`. Every line
should start with ✓. Tell the person what it says, and go to step 6.

If it stopped with an error, show the person the message as it is and stop. Running `up --here` again

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.

md
code and doesn't show it. Never reuse a code. If `connect` fails, show its message and ask for a new
code before trying again.

When you are back, run `npx controlclaw status` (with sudo if `connect` ran with it), tell the person
what it says, and go to step 6.

## 5. This machine as the firewall for several agents

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx controlclaw'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Running status through sudo npx can execute an unpinned package with root privileges. A read-only subcommand does not constrain malicious package initialization or other executable code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx controlclaw'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The diagnostic step executes an unpinned npm CLI before choosing a connection mode. A compromised release would run with the agent's permissions and could influence subsequent security-sensitive setup decisions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

md
2. A pairing code from that page. It works once, within 10 minutes.
3. Which mode. Run `npx controlclaw doctor --json` first and suggest the strongest one its `modes`
   allows: `docker`, then `remote` (a firewall with WireGuard, for another network) or `host`, then
   `proxy`. `host` and `remote` need sudo. `proxy` needs no root but only covers OpenClaw's own web
   requests: shell commands go around it, so it is for seeing what OpenClaw does, not for stopping it.

**Keep the code off the command line.** Every user can read a command line (`ps`), so the tool

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 141)May include surrounding context.

~/.controlclaw-pairing/code with your file tool (the code alone, on one line):

bash
umask 077 && mkdir -p ~/.controlclaw-pairing && chmod 700 ~/.controlclaw-pairing

The commands below read the file and delete it before connect starts. Tell the person OpenClaw

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx --yes controlclaw'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The --yes option permits automatic acquisition of an unpinned CLI during pairing. A compromised release could consume the pairing code from standard input, steal local credentials, or alter the intended firewall configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.