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Security audit

Familiar App

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent deployment guide, but it documents an unsafe production setup with default admin credentials, an opened service port, persistent systemd execution, and unpinned remote code execution.

Review this skill carefully before installing or following its VPS steps. Do not expose port 18790 publicly with the documented default credentials; set a strong password before launch, restrict access to localhost/VPN/IP allowlists, use TLS or a protected reverse proxy, pin the upstream repository to a reviewed commit or signed release, and run it under a dedicated locked-down service account.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Boot-Persistent Execution of Remotely Retrieved Application Code

Content
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/dev/null << 'SERVICE' [Unit] Description=Familiar App After=network.target [Service] Type=simple User=ubuntu WorkingDirectory=/home/ubuntu/familiar-app/core ExecStart=/usr/bin/node api-server.js Restart=always RestartSec=5 [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target SERVICE sudo systemctl enable --now familiar ``` ### Technical Analysis The deployment procedure uses `sudo` to write a system-wide systemd unit, starts it immediately, and enables it for subsequent boots. `Restart=always` also causes systemd to relaunch the application after normal exits or failures. Persistent operation is relevant to the declared autonomous social-presence platform, but boot-level persistence is not required for basic setup or interactive use. It materially increases risk because the application is retrieved from an unpinned remote repository and its implementation is not present in the audited project. The service runs as the general-purpose `ubuntu` account rather than a dedicated, restricted service account. The Node.js process does not run as root, which limits direct privilege, but root privileges are used during installation to establish durable execution. ### Attack Path 1. An operator follows the documented VPS deployment procedure. 2. Application code is cloned from the mutable upstream repository. 3. The operator uses `sudo` to register `api-server.js` as a system-wide service. 4. systemd starts the remotely obtained application immediately. 5. `Restart=always` relaunches the process after termination. 6. `WantedBy=multi-user.target` and `systemctl enable` cause it to execute after future reboots. 7. If the upstream application is malicious or later replaced before deployment, the payload gains durable execution as the `ubuntu` user. ...[truncated 551 chars]
Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Execution of Unpinned Code from a Mutable Remote Repository

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding

Network-Exposed Administrative Service Uses Publicly Known Default Credentials and Plain HTTP

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly instructs users to start the service with a known default admin password and then later recommends opening the service port, creating a realistic path to internet-exposed administrative access if operators deploy as written. Even though this is 'just documentation,' operational guidance that normalizes default credentials materially increases the chance of compromise of the deployed platform.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

bash
git clone https://github.com/m-lwatcher/familiar-app.git /home/ubuntu/familiar-app

sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/familiar.service > /dev/null << 'SERVICE'
[Unit]
Description=Familiar App
After=network.target

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

bash
git clone https://github.com/m-lwatcher/familiar-app.git /home/ubuntu/familiar-app

sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/familiar.service > /dev/null << 'SERVICE'
[Unit]
Description=Familiar App
After=network.target

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

bash
git clone https://github.com/m-lwatcher/familiar-app.git /home/ubuntu/familiar-app

sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/familiar.service > /dev/null << 'SERVICE'
[Unit]
Description=Familiar App
After=network.target

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

WantedBy=multi-user.target SERVICE

sudo systemctl enable --now familiar sudo ufw allow 18790/tcp

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The VPS deployment steps enable the service at boot and open TCP port 18790 without any warning that the dashboard/API may become remotely reachable. In the context of the same document also advertising default credentials, this omission increases the likelihood of accidental internet exposure of an administrative interface.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.