T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:49- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 49
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
bash python3 -m pip install pillowTechnical Analysis
The skill recommends installing Pillow directly from the package source configured for
pip, without specifying a reviewed version, package hash, lockfile, or trusted index. Consequently, the installed artifact depends on mutable package-index state and the user's localpipconfiguration.Package installation may execute third-party installation or build logic with the privileges of the user running
pip. Exploitation would require compromise of the legitimate package distribution channel, a malicious package source configured in the environment, or another supply-chain manipulation that causespipto resolve an attacker-controlled artifact. The audited project does not itself configure a malicious index or contain a remote payload.Attack Path
- A user requests contact-sheet generation.
- Pillow is unavailable in the active Python environment.
- The user or agent follows the documented
pip install pillowinstruction. pipresolves the dependency through its currently configured package index without a version or hash constraint.- If that source or the resolved distribution is compromised, attacker-controlled installation logic executes.
- Malicious code then runs with the permissions of the account performing the installation and may modify resources accessible to that account.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running
pip. The potential scope includes that user's readable files, writable files, environment variables, credentials available to the process, and network access allowed by the host. This instruction does not independently grant administrative privileges; elevated impact would require the installati ...[truncated 63 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin Pillow to a reviewed, compatible version rather than installing an unconstrained latest release.
- Require hashes for downloaded artifacts, preferably through a locked requirements file generated and reviewed for the supported platforms.
- Use a trusted, explicitly configured package index and disallow unexpected extra indexes.
- Install the dependency inside an isolated virtual environment with least-privilege permissions.
- Require explicit user approval before performing dependency installation.
- Prefer documenting dependency verification separately from normal skill execution. For example:
text Pillow==<reviewed-version> --hash=sha256:<verified-distribution-hash>Then install using hash enforcement:
bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt