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Security audit

Betalpha Finance

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This finance-data skill is mostly coherent, but it asks users to handle an API token in ways that deserve careful review before installation.

Install only if you trust ai.firstindex.cn with your Betalpha API token and finance queries. Configure the token manually rather than pasting it into chat, avoid printing the token with cat or Get-Content, keep the file permissions restrictive, and delete ~/.config/betalpha if you uninstall or no longer use the skill.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The trigger list is very broad and includes common financial terms such as 股票, 基金, 新闻, and 金融数据. This can cause the skill to activate in many ordinary finance-related conversations, increasing the chance that it will unnecessarily read local credentials and initiate network access to a third-party service.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs users to send their API token directly to the assistant for automatic configuration. Asking users to paste secrets into chat creates a high risk of credential exposure through logs, model context retention, screenshots, or accidental disclosure to other tools or integrations.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
### Linux / macOS
```bash
# 创建配置目录
mkdir -p ~/.config/betalpha

# 写入 Token（替换 YOUR_TOKEN_HERE 为您的实际 Token）
echo "YOUR_TOKEN_HERE" > ~/.config/betalpha/api_key.txt
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding
The guide instructs users to persist a long-lived API token in plaintext on disk under ~/.config/betalpha/api_key.txt. Even with restrictive permissions, plaintext token storage can be exposed through local compromise, backups, misconfigured sync tools, terminal history/screenshots during verification, or accidental disclosure, making credential theft possible.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.