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Security audit

Agent Browser Disabled

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This browser automation skill is mostly coherent, but it documents persistent authenticated browser state and broad page inspection features without enough safety guidance.

Install only if you trust the agent-browser npm package and are comfortable with a tool that can interact with authenticated web pages. Treat saved state files, screenshots, recordings, traces, cookies, storage dumps, and network logs as sensitive secrets; avoid using saved state for high-value accounts, restrict file permissions, and delete captured artifacts when finished. Prefer a pinned, reviewed package version and a sandboxed or disposable environment rather than a global latest-version install.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:17
Finding

Unpinned Global npm Package Installation and Installer Execution

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 17-19
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation and execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
npm install -g agent-browser
agent-browser install
agent-browser install --with-deps

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions globally install agent-browser without specifying an exact, reviewed version. npm may therefore resolve the command to a package release that did not exist when this skill was audited. npm installation can execute package lifecycle scripts, and the subsequent agent-browser install commands execute code supplied by the installed package.

The --with-deps operation may also install browser-related system dependencies. Its precise privileges depend on the operating system and environment, but it potentially has a broader effect than a project-local package installation. The finding is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently referenced package is malicious.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the agent-browser npm package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the relevant publisher account.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that satisfies the unpinned package request.
  3. A user follows the documented npm install -g agent-browser instruction.
  4. npm downloads the uncontrolled version and may run attacker-controlled lifecycle scripts.
  5. The user subsequently executes agent-browser install or agent-browser install --with-deps, providing another opportunity for attacker-controlled code to run.
  6. The payload performs actions with the permissions of the invoking user and potentially affects global tooling or system dependencies.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privileges. The attacker could access files available to that account, steal browser or de ...[truncated 246 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin agent-browser to an exact, reviewed version, for example npm install -g agent-browser@<reviewed-version>.
  • Prefer a project-local installation governed by a committed lockfile instead of a global installation.
  • Use npm ci for source-based installations so dependency resolution matches the reviewed lockfile.
  • Verify package provenance and integrity before installation, including the publisher, registry source, release signatures or attestations, and expected package hashes where available.
  • Review npm lifecycle scripts and the behavior of agent-browser install before execution.
  • Avoid --with-deps unless system dependencies are genuinely required. Document the packages and privileges it needs.
  • Run installation in a sandbox, container, or otherwise minimally privileged environment.
  • Establish a controlled dependency-update process in which new versions are reviewed and tested before the documented version is changed.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
CONTRIBUTING.md:23
Finding

Mutable Latest-Version Dependency Recommended for Issue Reproduction

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: CONTRIBUTING.md, lines 23-26
Vulnerability Type: Installation of a mutable, unreviewed latest package release
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

markdown
1. Install the latest version
   ```bash
   npm install -g agent-browser@latest
   ```

Technical Analysis

The contribution guide explicitly directs users to install the mutable latest npm distribution tag globally. A distribution tag is controlled by the package publisher and may be reassigned to a new release at any time. Consequently, the command does not provide reproducible dependency resolution and can execute package content that was never reviewed with this skill.

npm packages may define lifecycle scripts that execute during installation. Global installation also places the package in shared tooling locations rather than isolating it to the project. This does not establish that agent-browser is malicious; it creates an exploitable trust boundary if the package, publisher account, registry response, or dependency chain is compromised.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package, registry resolution path, or a transitive dependency.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns the latest distribution tag to it.
  3. A contributor follows the issue-reporting instructions and runs npm install -g agent-browser@latest.
  4. npm retrieves the attacker-controlled release and may execute its installation lifecycle scripts.
  5. The malicious package runs under the contributor's account and remains available as a globally installed command.
  6. Later invocations of agent-browser can continue executing the compromised implementation until it is removed or replaced.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution with the contributor's privileges, exposure of accessible source code and credentials, modification of globa ...[truncated 247 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace @latest with an exact version that has been reviewed and tested.
  • Record the approved version in the contribution guide and update it only through a documented dependency-review process.
  • Prefer a local development dependency with a committed lockfile and invoke it through the project's package manager.
  • Verify npm provenance or attestations, package ownership, registry configuration, and integrity metadata before approving a release.
  • Perform package installation in a disposable, minimally privileged environment.
  • Do not recommend sudo or administrator execution for npm package installation.
  • For issue reproduction, require contributors to report their existing version first and only request an upgrade to a specific known-good version when necessary.
  • Document removal and incident-response steps for a suspected compromised global installation, including uninstalling the package, clearing relevant npm caches, rotating potentially exposed credentials, and inspecting the host for unauthorized changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · CONTRIBUTING.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
## Adding New Commands to the Skill

Update SKILL.md when the upstream CLI adds new commands.
- Keep the Installation section
- Add new commands in the correct category
- Include usage examples

Context Window Stuffing

Medium
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

agent-browser open # Navigate to page agent-browser snapshot -i # Get interactive elements with refs agent-browser click @e1 # Click element by ref agent-browser fill @e2 "text" # Fill input by ref agent-browser close # Close browser

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents screenshots, PDFs, recordings, cookies, storage inspection, traces, and network request viewing without any caution that these outputs may capture credentials, personal data, session tokens, or internal application content. In a browser automation skill, these features materially increase the chance of collecting and exposing sensitive data during normal use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly promotes saving and reloading browser session state for authentication flows but does not warn that the state file can contain sensitive cookies, tokens, and other authenticated artifacts. In an agent context, this can lead to accidental persistence, reuse, or exfiltration of active login material across tasks, users, or environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented state save/load capability enables session persistence, which can preserve authenticated cookies and storage across runs. Without strong guidance on handling these artifacts securely, agents or users may unintentionally create reusable authentication bundles that can be stolen or misapplied.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 236)May include surrounding context.

bash
agent-browser state save auth.json    # Save session state
agent-browser state load auth.json    # Load saved state

Example: Form submission

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The example workflow normalizes reusing saved authenticated state in later sessions, which increases the likelihood that credentials or session tokens will be retained longer than necessary. In shared or agent-driven environments, such persisted state can enable unauthorized account access if copied, logged, or loaded into the wrong context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 265)May include surrounding context.

agent-browser wait --url "/dashboard" agent-browser state save auth.json

Later sessions: load saved state

agent-browser state load auth.json agent-browser open https://app.example.com/dashboard

text