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Security audit

a2a-Market-ACP-Lite-Negotiation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent, but it needs review because it can automatically negotiate through a gateway while exposing tokens and sending negotiation context to a model tool.

Review before installing. Use only with a trusted local or HTTPS gateway, replace all default tokens with unique secrets, avoid passing API keys on the command line, and understand that the OpenClaw engine may send negotiation/session data to a model provider. Do not use it for real financial or business negotiations until token handling, TLS guidance, and policy checks around model decisions are tightened.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
src/cli/index.js:779
Finding

Gateway Authentication Token Exposed in Query Strings and Standard Output

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
src/cli/index.js:479
Finding

Untrusted Gateway Content Is Embedded Directly in the OpenClaw Instruction Prompt

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
src/cli/index.js:740
Finding

Predictable Shared Default Used for Application-Level Authentication

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: a2a-market-acp-lite-negotiation
description: Gateway-only ACP negotiation skill with optional OpenClaw model-driven turn decisions.
---

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
node src/cli/index.js --role buyer --agent-id buyer-openclaw --gateway http://127.0.0.1:3085

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

md
node src/cli/index.js --role buyer --agent-id buyer-openclaw --gateway http://127.0.0.1:3085

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
node src/cli/index.js --role buyer --agent-id buyer-openclaw --gateway http://127.0.0.1:3085

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation states the skill is now gateway-only and that single-turn local decision mode has been removed. However, the same file later documents --decision-engine rule|openclaw and explicitly says NEGOTIATION_TURN is decided by the selected engine, which indicates local decision logic remains part of the skill's behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation instructs users to register, poll, and respond over HTTP and references authentication tokens and optional direct API keys, but it does not warn about transmitting credentials or negotiation data to a gateway. In practice, this can lead users to run the skill against non-TLS endpoints, expose secrets in command history, or send sensitive business context to an untrusted gateway without understanding the risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The OpenClaw path can inject a directly supplied API key into the child process environment and invoke an external model provider without any explicit user-facing disclosure at the point of execution. In a skill/agent context, this can lead to unanticipated transmission of negotiation context and potentially sensitive session data to third-party LLM services, especially when execution is triggered through flags or stdin rather than an interactive consent flow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.