T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
src/cli/index.js:779- Finding
Gateway Authentication Token Exposed in Query Strings and Standard Output
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly coherent, but it needs review because it can automatically negotiate through a gateway while exposing tokens and sending negotiation context to a model tool.
Review before installing. Use only with a trusted local or HTTPS gateway, replace all default tokens with unique secrets, avoid passing API keys on the command line, and understand that the OpenClaw engine may send negotiation/session data to a model provider. Do not use it for real financial or business negotiations until token handling, TLS guidance, and policy checks around model decisions are tightened.
src/cli/index.js:779Gateway Authentication Token Exposed in Query Strings and Standard Output
src/cli/index.js:479Untrusted Gateway Content Is Embedded Directly in the OpenClaw Instruction Prompt
src/cli/index.js:740Predictable Shared Default Used for Application-Level Authentication
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
---
name: a2a-market-acp-lite-negotiation
description: Gateway-only ACP negotiation skill with optional OpenClaw model-driven turn decisions.
---
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node src/cli/index.js --role buyer --agent-id buyer-openclaw --gateway http://127.0.0.1:3085
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node src/cli/index.js --role buyer --agent-id buyer-openclaw --gateway http://127.0.0.1:3085
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node src/cli/index.js --role buyer --agent-id buyer-openclaw --gateway http://127.0.0.1:3085
The documentation states the skill is now gateway-only and that single-turn local decision mode has been removed. However, the same file later documents --decision-engine rule|openclaw and explicitly says NEGOTIATION_TURN is decided by the selected engine, which indicates local decision logic remains part of the skill's behavior.
The skill documentation instructs users to register, poll, and respond over HTTP and references authentication tokens and optional direct API keys, but it does not warn about transmitting credentials or negotiation data to a gateway. In practice, this can lead users to run the skill against non-TLS endpoints, expose secrets in command history, or send sensitive business context to an untrusted gateway without understanding the risk.
The OpenClaw path can inject a directly supplied API key into the child process environment and invoke an external model provider without any explicit user-facing disclosure at the point of execution. In a skill/agent context, this can lead to unanticipated transmission of negotiation context and potentially sensitive session data to third-party LLM services, especially when execution is triggered through flags or stdin rather than an interactive consent flow.