Back to skill

Security audit

Mirror Source Manager

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed mirror-management helper, but using it can persistently change package download sources for future installs.

Install only if you trust x-cmd and the mirror providers you choose. Prefer Homebrew or a reviewed install script, avoid curl-to-shell on sensitive machines, check the current mirror first, and require explicit confirmation before running set or unset commands.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The trigger description is extremely broad, covering many generic package-manager and download-speed queries. This can cause the skill to activate in contexts where the user did not explicitly ask to modify mirror settings, increasing the chance of unintended configuration changes to system or developer tooling.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The usage guidance presents state-changing commands without warning that they alter package-manager configuration and may affect future installs globally or per-user. Users may run commands assuming they are read-only or temporary, which can silently redirect dependency downloads to third-party mirrors and introduce supply-chain or operational risk.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.