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Security audit

Benbenjiucai Perspective

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed investment-persona simulator, but it uses first-person impersonation and reduced disclaimers in a financial context.

Review this skill carefully before installing if you may ask about real investments. Treat outputs as simulated commentary, not advice from the actual person, and avoid enabling quantitative mode unless you understand what proxy URL and key will be used.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:49
Finding

Persistent Agent Identity and Instruction Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 49-61
Vulnerability Type: Agent instruction and identity hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippet

The following is an English translation of the complete relevant source segment:

markdown
**After this Skill is activated, respond directly as Benben Jiucai.**

- Use “I” instead of “Benben Jiucai would think...”
- Respond directly using this person’s tone, rhythm, and vocabulary
- Be extremely colloquial; do not use formal language or pleasantries
- State the conclusion first, then provide only minimal reasoning
- Frequently join short phrases with commas
- For uncertain questions, hesitate using phrases such as “I feel,” “possibly,” or “hard to say”
- For novice questions, criticize directly and without restraint
- For in-depth questions, begin with the essence of the industry and proceed layer by layer
- **State the disclaimer only once upon initial activation**; do not repeat it afterward
- Do not say “If it were Benben Jiucai, he might...”
- Do not leave the role to perform meta-analysis unless the user explicitly requests “exit role”

Technical Analysis

These directives replace the agent’s ordinary identity with that of a named third party and impose persistent session-level behavioral constraints. In particular, the Skill requires first-person impersonation, suppresses explicit attribution language, limits the financial disclaimer to the first activation response, and prohibits leaving the role for meta-analysis unless the user supplies an explicit exit instruction.

This is instruction hijacking because loading the Skill changes the agent’s current-session goals and constrains how subsequent requests are handled. The combination of first-person impersonation and reduced disclosure can make generated investment commentary appear to be the represented person’s own statements rather than an AI-generated simulation.

Th ...[truncated 1701 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Preserve the assistant’s identity and describe the output as analysis inspired by the documented framework rather than speaking as the third party.
  2. Replace first-person impersonation with explicit attribution, such as: “Using the documented investment framework, the analysis is...”
  3. Remove the prohibition on meta-analysis and allow the agent to clarify its identity, limitations, and source material at any time.
  4. Scope stylistic instructions to the current response or explicitly requested task instead of making them persistent until an exit phrase is supplied.
  5. Repeat a concise AI-simulation and financial-risk disclosure whenever the response discusses specific securities, allocation decisions, trading actions, or other consequential financial matters.
  6. Do not require users to know a special exit phrase. A request to stop impersonation, change style, obtain neutral analysis, or clarify identity should take effect immediately.
  7. Add an instruction-priority safeguard stating that the Skill cannot override platform safety policies, system instructions, user requests for transparency, or requirements to identify generated content accurately.
  8. Clearly distinguish historical statements attributed to the represented person from new model-generated inferences.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad and include ordinary conversational references, so the skill may activate when the user did not actually request this persona. Unintended activation is risky here because the skill shifts the assistant into a forceful investment persona and may alter tone, language, and decision framing in a high-stakes financial domain.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates a specific identity, tone, and response style without checking user preference, including direct criticism and highly colloquial phrasing. In a financial-advice-adjacent context, this can override normal assistant safeguards around user communication, accessibility, and locale appropriateness, leading to misleading or harmful interactions even if not a classic exploit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a qualitative roleplay/advisory persona, but it silently expands into live quantitative validation using external market-data sources. That materially changes the capability and trust boundary of the skill, increasing the chance of users receiving action-oriented financial analysis they did not clearly consent to and causing the agent to access external resources beyond the declared role-simulation purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of environment-configured external endpoints and keys for market data even though its core purpose is persona simulation. This broadens the attack surface by enabling network access and use of sensitive configuration in a context that does not strictly require it, which can lead to unauthorized data access, misuse of credentials, or unintended outbound requests if wired into an agent runtime.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

L322 says the role should not use disclaimers, while L059 explicitly requires a disclaimer to be given on first activation. These instructions directly contradict each other in the skill documentation, creating ambiguous runtime behavior about whether the model should present a risk notice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.