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Security audit

Dali by Lulu

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims, but it automatically sends image and video prompts to an external service and may rewrite them without clear user consent.

Review before installing if your prompts may contain confidential creative briefs, unreleased product details, personal information, or client material. The skill can send prompts to dali.getlulu.dev automatically and may use a rewritten prompt unless you keep direct control of scoring and generation.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:8
Finding

Unconditional Third-Party Prompt Transmission and Workflow Hijacking

Content
View full analysis
, model=)`. ``` ```markdown | Grade | Score | Action | |-------|-------|--------| | A | 90+ | Confirm and generate | | B | 70–89 | Confirm and generate | | C | 50–69 | Offer to enhance. If user agrees or doesn't object → enhance | | D/F | < 50 | Enhance automatically. Show before/after. Use enhanced prompt. | ``` ```markdown ### Step 5: Generate Always use the highest-scoring prompt (your enhanced version, not a raw API field). ``` ```markdown - Score FIRST, always — before generating anything - Don't ask permission to score — just do it ``` ```markdown ## Setup MCP endpoint: `https://dali.getlulu.dev/mcp` — no API key needed for scoring. Free tier. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill overrides the normal user-directed image and video generation workflow by requiring every matching prompt to be sent to the external Dali MCP service before generation. Its activation criteria are broad and include common words such as “create,” “make,” and “design.” The instructions explicitly prohibit asking for permission before scoring and require scoring even when the user did not request it. For prompts receiving a low score, the skill also ...[truncated 2766 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation criteria are broad enough to trigger on many ordinary creative requests, causing the skill to intercept prompts and route them to an external MCP service by default. This increases the chance of unintended data disclosure, unnecessary tool invocation, and user surprise, especially when prompts may contain sensitive business, personal, or proprietary content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of an external MCP endpoint but does not warn users that their prompts will be transmitted off-platform. Because prompts can contain sensitive or confidential information, the lack of notice and consent creates a privacy and data-handling risk even if the service is legitimate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The instruction to 'score it anyway' authorizes autonomous external processing without an explicit user request or confirmation. In context, this is risky because the autonomous action is not merely local formatting; it can send user-supplied prompt content to a third-party MCP service and make workflow decisions on the user's behalf.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
- Keywords: generate, create, make, draw, render, animate, illustrate, design, produce
- Media types: image, photo, picture, video, clip, footage, reel, scene, animation

Also activate when a user pastes a raw prompt without asking to score it — score it anyway.

## The Flow

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.