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Security audit

Plane.so CLI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Plane.so skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it asks for authority to change and delete project data while the package does not contain the bundled CLI it claims to provide.

Review before installing. Use a scoped Plane.so API token if possible, confirm targets before running delete or update commands, and verify the package actually includes the intended plane-so-cli executable/source because the inspected artifact did not contain the bundled script it claims to provide.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
export PLANE_WORKSPACE="your-workspace-slug"
```

Get your API key: **Plane > Profile Settings > Personal Access Tokens**

## Commands
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The markdown lists `plane-so-cli issues delete -p PROJECT_ID ISSUE_ID` as an available command, but the surrounding documentation does not warn that this operation deletes work items and may be irreversible. For markdown files, destructive behaviors that could affect user data should be accompanied by explicit warnings.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
| Endpoint | Data sent | Purpose |
|----------|-----------|---------|
| `https://api.plane.so/api/v1/*` | API key (header), project/issue data (body) | All Plane.so operations |

- Your `PLANE_API_KEY` is sent as an `X-API-Key` header exclusively to `https://api.plane.so`
- The API host is hardcoded — no environment variable can redirect requests to another domain
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.