T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:63- Finding
TeamCycle Password Passed Through Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 63
Vulnerability Type: Exposure of authentication credentials through process arguments
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
The documented command has the following structure, with the password supplied as its second positional argument:
shell python scripts/bug_reporter.py zhanju.zhang "PASSWORD" 58 "BUG_TITLE" "HTML_BUG_DESCRIPTION" 211 "PRIORITY" "PHASE"Technical Analysis
The documented invocation requires a TeamCycle password to be entered directly into a command-line argument. Command-line arguments are not an appropriate channel for authentication secrets because they may be exposed through:
- Shell history files.
- Process listings and process-monitoring utilities.
- Terminal-session recording.
- Endpoint telemetry and audit logs.
- Wrapper scripts or automation logs that record the complete command.
- Error reports that include the invoked command.
Although the password shown in the documentation is a placeholder rather than a hardcoded credential, users following the documented workflow are instructed to replace it with a real password. This creates a concrete credential-disclosure risk.
Attack Path
- A user follows the documented example and replaces the password placeholder with a valid TeamCycle password.
- The user executes the command in a terminal or through an automation system.
- The complete command is retained in shell history, captured by process telemetry, or temporarily exposed through process inspection.
- A local user, monitoring-system operator, compromised process, or party with access to collected logs retrieves the password.
- The exposed credentials are used to authenticate to TeamCycle as the affected user.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation exposes the TeamCycle account credentials of the user invoking the Skill. The resulting privileges are limited to those assigned to ...[truncated 244 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Do not accept passwords through positional command-line arguments.
- Retrieve credentials from an operating-system credential manager, managed secret store, or protected runtime secret injection mechanism.
- For interactive use, request the password through a hidden-input prompt that disables terminal echo.
- If an environment variable is unavoidable, ensure it is injected only at runtime, is never logged, and is removed immediately after use. A managed secret store remains preferable.
- Replace password-based authentication with a narrowly scoped API token when TeamCycle supports it.
- Ensure tokens have the minimum permissions necessary to create defects and have short expiration periods where possible.
- Redact secrets from application logs, exception messages, telemetry, and debugging output.
- Update the documentation so examples contain no workflow that instructs users to place credentials on the command line.
- Advise users who have already followed this workflow to remove affected shell-history entries and rotate the exposed password.
