T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:1002- Finding
Automatic Installation of Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This developer utility skill is broadly coherent, but users should review it because some runnable examples make external requests, auto-install packages, and include unsafe crypto examples for secrets.
Review each command before allowing an agent to run it. Avoid the auto-install paths unless you intentionally want Homebrew to modify the machine, do not use the AES or BIP39 snippets for real secrets, wallets, or production encryption, and do not put tokens, internal URLs, or private payloads into the network examples.
SKILL.md:1002Automatic Installation of Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies
SKILL.md:1892AES Example Discloses Encryption Keys and Uses Unauthenticated Cryptography
SKILL.md:707Mnemonic Generator Is Predictable and Does Not Implement BIP39
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
English:
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import json
def env_to_dict(env_string):
"""Convert .env format to dict"""
result = {}
for line in env_string.strip().split('\n'):
line = line.strip()
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
import json
def env_to_dict(env_string):
"""Convert .env format to dict"""
result = {}
for line in env_string.strip().split('\n'):
line = line.strip()
The network tools encourage use of external services like ifconfig.me, ipinfo.io, ip-api.com, GitHub, and httpbin without warning that user data, IP address, headers, tokens, or request bodies may be sent off-device. In an agent setting, this omission can lead to unintentional data disclosure and privacy violations.
The HTTP request test examples explicitly transmit data to external endpoints, including POST bodies and authorization headers. If adapted by an agent with real user inputs, these examples could leak sensitive information or perform unintended outbound actions.
English:
# GET request
curl -s https://api.github.com
# POST request
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name":"test"}' https://httpbin.org/post
The QR code generator goes beyond local data transformation by invoking system binaries and automatically installing missing software with Homebrew. In an agent context, auto-install behavior can modify the host environment unexpectedly and may be abused to trigger unauthorized package installation or command execution.
The QR reader similarly auto-installs external software and then executes it, which expands the skill from parsing data into changing the local system state. This creates unnecessary risk in agent environments where package manager execution can have security and supply-chain implications.
The ASCII art generator includes automatic installation of figlet through Homebrew, which is unrelated to the core transformation task and changes the system environment. Such behavior is risky because a simple text-formatting request should not trigger package installation or arbitrary subprocess execution.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
result = chmod_calculator(user_r=True, user_w=True, user_x=True,
group_r=True, group_x=True,
other_r=True)
print(f"chmod 755 = {result}") # 755
# Decode permissions
print("\n=== Decode chmod values ===")
The trigger list is extremely broad and contains many common phrases, increasing the chance the skill activates in contexts the user did not intend. Over-broad activation is dangerous because it can expose powerful network and system-command features during unrelated conversations.