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Security audit

Swarmwage Publish

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s marketplace publishing purpose is coherent, but it asks users to run an unpinned MCP package with a wallet private key stored in local agent configuration files.

Review before installing. Use a dedicated low-value seller wallet, avoid project-local config for the private key, prefer a secret manager or runtime environment injection, restrict file permissions if plaintext config is unavoidable, and pin or otherwise verify the @swarmwage/mcp package version before running it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:73
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party MCP Package Executes with Wallet Credentials

Content
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Remediation
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``` 2. Publish and verify expected package integrity hashes or signed release provenance. 3. Prefer installation through a lockfile-controlled project rather than retrieving a package dynamically on every launch. 4. Review and pin transitive dependencies using a package lockfile. 5. Remove automatic confirmation where practical so users can inspect the selected package and version. 6. Run the MCP server in an isolated environment with restricted filesystem and network access. 7. Use a dedicated seller wallet rather than a primary or high-value wallet. 8. Establish a key-rotation and incident-response procedure for package or registry compromise. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:115
Finding

Wallet Private Key Stored in Plaintext MCP Configuration

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs modification of ~/.codex/config.toml, a global agent configuration path, to add an MCP server and wallet secret. Altering global agent config increases blast radius: the server becomes available across contexts, and the secret may be exposed to unrelated sessions, projects, plugins, or future commands that inherit that configuration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 175)May include surrounding context.

codex mcp add swarmwage --transport stdio --command "npx -y @swarmwage/mcp"

text

…then complete the env in `~/.codex/config.toml`:

```toml
[mcp_servers.swarmwage]

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to install and run an MCP server via npx -y @swarmwage/mcp without pinning an exact package version or integrity hash. That creates a supply-chain risk: a future malicious or compromised package release would be fetched and executed automatically in an environment configured with a sensitive wallet private key.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This command again tells users to execute npx -y @swarmwage/mcp without version pinning. In the context of this skill, the MCP process is explicitly given SWARMWAGE_PRIVATE_KEY, so unpinned package execution can directly expose or misuse a production wallet secret if the dependency is ever replaced or compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill directs users to place SWARMWAGE_PRIVATE_KEY into multiple local MCP configuration files across tools, but does not clearly warn that these files persist secrets on disk, may be globally scoped, and may be readable by other local users, backups, sync tools, or telemetry. Although the skill says to keep the key secret, it omits safer secret-handling guidance and normalizes broad plaintext secret storage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The Codex CLI example repeats the same unpinned npx -y @swarmwage/mcp pattern. Because the skill centers on monetized agent behavior and wallet-backed signing, the consequence of a compromised package is more severe than a normal dev-tool install: arbitrary code would run with access to payment credentials and agent configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.