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Security audit

A2A 文章服务平台

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This paid article-service skill is coherent in purpose, but it handles payment and publishing workflows with under-disclosed and insecure data paths.

Review this skill before installing. It may send your article instructions, order numbers, and payment credentials to a hardcoded remote HTTP service, and it can support automated public-account publishing. Only use it if you trust the operator, understand the local order-file storage, and are comfortable with the current lack of encrypted transport and confirmation controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (5)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/service.py:21
Finding

Payment Credentials and User Data Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/service.py, lines 21-80
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive information transmitted without authenticated encryption
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code:

python
API_BASE = "http://43.136.97.223/clawtip-api/api/getServiceResult"

payload = json.dumps({
    "question": question,
    "orderNo": order_no,
    "credential": credential,
}, ensure_ascii=False)

req = urllib.request.Request(
    API_BASE,
    data=payload.encode("utf-8"),
    headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
    method="POST",
)

try:
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
        data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
except Exception as e:
    raise RuntimeError(f"Service-result request failed: {e}")

Technical Analysis

The fulfillment endpoint uses plaintext HTTP and is addressed through a bare IP address. The request contains the payment credential, order number, and complete user-supplied question. HTTP provides neither transport confidentiality nor endpoint authentication.

An attacker able to observe or modify traffic—such as a malicious Wi-Fi operator, compromised router, ISP-level adversary, or local network attacker—can read the credential and user content. The attacker can also modify requests or responses because the client does not authenticate the server or cryptographically verify the returned data.

The use of a bare IP also prevents the application from establishing a clear, domain-based trust relationship with the advertised service provider.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes service.py with a valid order number and payment credential.
  2. The script serializes the credential, order number, and user question into JSON.
  3. The script sends the JSON body to http://43.136.97.223/... over plaintext HTTP.
  4. A network-positioned attacker intercepts the request.
  5. The attacker captures the payment credential and ...[truncated 698 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace the HTTP endpoint with an authenticated HTTPS endpoint on a verified service-provider domain.
  • Require valid certificate-chain and hostname verification; do not disable TLS validation.
  • Avoid using a bare IP address as the production trust identity.
  • Use short-lived, single-use credentials cryptographically bound to the order, requested operation, recipient, and expiration time.
  • Minimize transmitted user data and avoid sending information unnecessary for fulfillment.
  • Add signed responses or application-level integrity validation where the payment protocol requires stronger guarantees.
  • Ensure credentials and full request bodies are never written to logs or exposed in exception messages.
  • Reject redirects from HTTPS to HTTP and document the expected backend hostname.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
README.md:134
Finding

Documentation Falsely Claims HTTPS and SM4 Transport Protection

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md, lines 134-139 and line 196
Vulnerability Type: Misrepresentation of security controls
Risk Level: Medium

Relevant Documentation, translated into English from the source text:

text
Communication protocol: HTTPS plus SM4 encryption
Encryption algorithm: SM4
Deployment address: http://43.136.97.223/clawtip-api/

All transaction data is transmitted using SM4 encryption.

Technical Analysis

The documentation states that communications use HTTPS and SM4 encryption, but the displayed deployment address uses HTTP. The audited implementation in both order creation and fulfillment also uses plaintext HTTP. No client-side SM4 encryption or verification implementation appears in the project.

Consequently, the stated transport-security guarantees are not implemented by the audited client. Users and agents may submit payment credentials and sensitive content under the mistaken belief that the communication channel is encrypted and authenticated.

Attack Path

  1. A user reviews the documentation and relies on its claims of HTTPS and SM4 protection.
  2. The user creates an order or submits a payment credential through the supplied scripts.
  3. The scripts communicate with the documented HTTP endpoint without TLS.
  4. A network-positioned attacker reads or changes the supposedly protected traffic.
  5. The user may not recognize the exposure because the documentation explicitly represents the connection as encrypted.

Impact Assessment

This issue increases the likelihood that users will disclose payment credentials, publishing content, and transaction metadata over an insecure channel. It conceals the actual trust boundary and may prevent users or operators from applying compensating controls. Exploitation has the same network scope as the underlying plaintext-transport flaw.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Implement authenticated HTTPS before claiming encrypted transport.
  • Remove the SM4 claim unless the client actually applies and verifies SM4-based protection.
  • Document the exact fields transmitted, endpoint hostname, transport protocol, and trust assumptions.
  • Ensure examples, architecture diagrams, operational guidance, and source-code constants all identify the same secure endpoint.
  • Add automated tests or policy checks that reject plaintext production URLs.
  • Perform an independent review of any server-side encryption claim and clearly distinguish application-layer encryption from TLS.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
shared/file_utils.py:21
Finding

Unvalidated Order Number Enables Path Traversal in Order File Operations

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: shared/file_utils.py, lines 21-39
Vulnerability Type: Path traversal and unintended file read or overwrite
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code:

python
def load_order(indicator: str, order_no: str) -> dict:
    """Load an order JSON file using its indicator and order number."""
    base_dir = get_orders_base_dir(indicator)
    json_path = os.path.join(base_dir, f"{order_no}.json")
    if not os.path.isfile(json_path):
        raise RuntimeError(f"Order file does not exist: {json_path}")
    with open(json_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        return json.load(f)


def save_order(indicator: str, order_no: str, order_data: dict) -> str:
    """Write order data to the fixed order directory."""
    base_dir = get_orders_base_dir(indicator)
    os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)

    json_path = os.path.join(base_dir, f"{order_no}.json")
    with open(json_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        json.dump(order_data, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)

    return json_path

Technical Analysis

The order_no value is interpolated directly into a filesystem path without validation, canonicalization, or containment checking. Path separators and parent-directory components such as ../ are therefore accepted.

For load_order, the value originates from a command-line argument in service.py. For save_order, the order number comes from the remote create-order response. Because that response is delivered over unauthenticated plaintext HTTP, a network attacker can alter it before the value reaches save_order.

The forced .json suffix limits target filenames to paths ending in .json, but it does not prevent traversal outside the intended order directory. Existing JSON files may be read, and writable JSON paths may be overwritten with attacker-influenced order data.

Attack Path

  1. The user runs create_order.py.
  2. A network-p ...[truncated 995 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Validate order numbers against a strict allowlist, for example ^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$.
  • Reject values containing path separators, drive prefixes, null bytes, or ...
  • Resolve the candidate path with pathlib.Path.resolve() and verify that it remains beneath the resolved order directory.
  • Treat order numbers returned by the backend as untrusted input even after TLS is introduced.
  • Use server-generated identifiers with a fixed documented format and length limit.
  • Open files defensively and consider protections against symbolic-link traversal.
  • Use atomic file creation and restrictive permissions for order records.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/service.py:89
Finding

Fulfillment Script Reports Success After Payment or Service Failure

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/service.py, lines 89-124
Vulnerability Type: Incorrect payment-state reporting and fail-open workflow signaling
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

python
if data.get("responseCode") != "200":
    return f"Failed to obtain service result: {data}"

pay_status = data.get("payStatus")
if pay_status != "SUCCESS":
    error_info = data.get("errorInfo", "Payment was not successful")
    return f"Payment was not successful: {error_info}"

answer = data.get("answer", "")
already_fulfilled = data.get("alreadyFulfilled", False)

if already_fulfilled:
    print("This order was already fulfilled")

return answer

# Later in the command-line entry point:
result = get_service_result(
    args.question,
    args.order_no,
    args.credential,
    args.slug,
)
print(result)
print("PAY_STATUS: SUCCESS")

Technical Analysis

get_service_result() returns ordinary strings for multiple failure conditions rather than raising an exception or returning a structured failure result. The command-line entry point then unconditionally prints PAY_STATUS: SUCCESS after every normal return.

As a result, a backend response indicating payment failure or service failure is followed by an explicit success marker. An orchestrating agent that relies on this marker can incorrectly treat an unsuccessful transaction as completed.

Attack Path

  1. The script receives a backend response with a non-success response code or a payment status other than SUCCESS.
  2. get_service_result() converts the failure into an error string and returns normally.
  3. The command-line entry point prints that error string.
  4. It then unconditionally prints PAY_STATUS: SUCCESS.
  5. A calling agent or parser prioritizes the machine-readable success marker and records the transaction as successful despite the failure.

A malicious or impersonated backend can delibera ...[truncated 464 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Emit PAY_STATUS: SUCCESS only after the response code, payment status, and fulfillment result have all been validated.
  • Return structured results containing separate success, payment-status, answer, and error fields.
  • Exit with a nonzero status code for network, backend, payment, and fulfillment failures.
  • Avoid encoding failures as normal answer strings.
  • Define a single unambiguous machine-readable output schema.
  • Add tests covering unsuccessful payment, malformed responses, backend errors, empty answers, and already-fulfilled orders.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:4
Finding

Skill Instructions Attempt to Override Language Preferences and Solicit Internal Reasoning

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 4-17
Vulnerability Type: Agent behavior manipulation through Skill instructions
Risk Level: Medium

Relevant Instruction, translated into English from the source text:

text
You should interact with the user in Chinese, including your thought process.

Technical Analysis

The Skill includes a persistent instruction requiring the agent to use a specific language and to expose its thought process. Neither behavior is necessary to create an order or obtain the advertised article service.

When Skill text is incorporated into an agent's active instructions, this directive can conflict with the user's language preference and with platform rules that prohibit disclosure of private internal reasoning. It therefore attempts to alter session-level behavior beyond the functional requirements of the Skill.

Attack Path

  1. The agent loads SKILL.md while handling a request related to the advertised services.
  2. The embedded language and reasoning-disclosure directive becomes part of the active Skill context.
  3. The agent follows the Skill directive instead of the user's preferred language or platform reasoning policy.
  4. The response may expose internal reasoning or other context that should not be disclosed.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation affects the agent's current conversational behavior. It can override user-facing language choices and may cause disclosure of sensitive internal reasoning or contextual information. The instruction does not create operating-system privileges, persistence, or direct code execution.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove all instructions requesting disclosure of internal reasoning or thought processes.
  • Remove mandatory language overrides unrelated to service execution.
  • Follow the user's requested language and the host platform's response policies.
  • Restrict Skill instructions to operational requirements such as argument validation, order creation, payment verification, and fulfillment.
  • Review Skill metadata and body text for directives that alter general agent behavior beyond the Skill's legitimate scope.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (23)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

技能明确要求向用户披露内部 chain-of-thought,这是严重的安全与隐私风险。攻击者可利用暴露的推理过程推断系统限制、优化提示注入、获取决策细节,尤其在涉及支付凭证和本地脚本执行的技能中,泄露中间推理会显著增加绕过防护与窃取敏感信息的机会。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

该技能自称是文章服务平台,但文档暴露的关键能力是本地文件读写、订单数据持久化以及固定路径订单文件访问,这些都属于不同的风险面且未被用户预期。将敏感本地操作隐藏在与内容服务不一致的包装下,会增加凭证泄露、数据污染和供应链式滥用风险。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

该技能自称是文章服务平台,但文档暴露的关键能力是本地文件读写、订单数据持久化以及固定路径订单文件访问,这些都属于不同的风险面且未被用户预期。将敏感本地操作隐藏在与内容服务不一致的包装下,会增加凭证泄露、数据污染和供应链式滥用风险。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

该技能自称是文章服务平台,但文档暴露的关键能力是本地文件读写、订单数据持久化以及固定路径订单文件访问,这些都属于不同的风险面且未被用户预期。将敏感本地操作隐藏在与内容服务不一致的包装下,会增加凭证泄露、数据污染和供应链式滥用风险。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

技能明确要求向用户披露内部 chain-of-thought,这是严重的安全与隐私风险。攻击者可利用暴露的推理过程推断系统限制、优化提示注入、获取决策细节,尤其在涉及支付凭证和本地脚本执行的技能中,泄露中间推理会显著增加绕过防护与窃取敏感信息的机会。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

该指令要求助手暴露内部思考过程,属于不适当的敏感决策信息泄露。即便没有直接暴露凭证,也会泄漏安全审查逻辑和限制条件,为后续社会工程、提示攻击和策略绕过提供素材。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

重复强化中文唯一交互要求进一步限制用户选择,虽然主要是产品设计问题,但在涉及付费与凭证处理场景中会降低用户正确理解风险提示与授权条款的概率。其危险性低于直接数据泄露,但在当前技能上下文中仍不应忽视。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

重复要求包含思考过程表明这不是偶然措辞,而是技能设计的一部分。重复强化会提高模型受诱导泄露内部推理的概率,在支付与脚本执行场景中尤其危险,因为可帮助攻击者逐步优化输入以影响执行路径。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

代码将支付凭证、订单号和用户请求通过明文 HTTP 发送到硬编码后端,网络路径上的攻击者可窃听、篡改或重放这些敏感数据。该技能的业务场景本身依赖支付校验与服务履约,因此凭证泄露会直接破坏鉴权与交易完整性,风险高于普通非敏感请求。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

README 明确宣传“文章全自动化”“自动发布到公众号,全程无需人工干预”,但未给出足够醒目的风险提示、权限范围说明、确认机制或失败回滚说明。该技能与用户公众号账号、对外发布内容直接相关,在无人工复核的情况下可能导致误发、批量滥发、品牌声誉受损,甚至因内容不当引发合规问题。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

文档一方面宣称“所有交易数据使用 HTTPS 传输”,另一方面却把后端部署地址写成 http://43.136.97.223/clawtip-api/,这会误导集成方通过明文 HTTP 传输订单号、问题描述和支付凭证。对于带有支付与履约语义的 A2A 技能,这类传输可被中间人窃听、篡改或重放,直接影响支付安全与服务结果可信性。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

该 README 未明确提醒用户:其请求内容、订单号及支付凭证会被发送到远程后端进行支付校验和履约。对于涉及支付、内容生成和公众号发布的技能,这些数据可能包含商业意图、账号操作上下文甚至可被滥用的支付凭据;缺少隐私与数据流告知会导致用户在不知情下向第三方暴露敏感信息。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

技能仅声明了 network.outbound 与 payment.process,但文档明确要求执行本地 Python 脚本,并隐含读取/写入订单文件与支付凭证。这会造成声明权限与实际能力不一致,降低审计可见性,使调用方无法准确评估本地文件和命令执行风险。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

技能要求“包含你的思考过程”,即诱导模型向用户暴露内部推理。思维链披露会泄漏安全策略、判断依据、潜在系统提示线索或可被攻击者用于提示注入迭代的中间信息,与该文章服务场景无关且危险。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

“用户发出相关请求时自动触发”过于宽泛,可能使技能在仅松散相关的请求上被调用,尤其该技能还关联支付和本地脚本执行。触发边界模糊会增加误触发、误收费、误处理用户内容以及不必要暴露凭证流程的风险。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

文档没有向用户充分警示:服务会运行本地 Python 脚本,并处理支付凭证与用户内容。这种缺乏透明披露的设计会让用户在不知情的情况下授权高风险操作,不利于建立有效同意与安全审计。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

文档直接指导执行本地脚本创建订单,说明技能实际依赖命令执行能力,但这一能力未被充分限定或与声明用途清晰绑定。若用户输入被直接传入脚本参数,且缺乏额外约束,还可能扩大为命令/参数注入或不安全自动化链路。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

履约阶段要求执行本地脚本并传入 question、order_no、payCredential,属于高敏感命令执行路径。将用户内容与支付凭证一起交给脚本处理,如果无边界控制、日志脱敏和参数校验,可能导致凭证泄露或被下游脚本滥用。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

该脚本会将用户输入的 question 通过明文 HTTP POST 发送到硬编码的远程 IP 地址,传输过程中缺乏 TLS 保护,也没有任何面向用户的提示或确认。这样会导致请求内容、订单元数据以及服务使用信息可被中间人窃听、篡改或重放,尤其该技能涉及付费下单流程和文章发布场景,风险高于普通遥测。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

脚本会把订单号、金额、用户问题、支付目标以及 encryptedData 等返回数据持久化到本地文件,但没有任何用户可见提示,也未体现最小化存储、权限控制或敏感字段保护。若本地环境被其他用户、进程或日志收集系统访问,这些支付和业务数据可能泄露,并可被用于关联用户请求或辅助后续攻击。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The module docstring, CLI description, prompts, and user-facing messages are all written in Chinese, and the usage examples assume Chinese-language interaction. There is no indication that users may choose another language or that the tool is intentionally limited to a Chinese-only regional context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

安全说明声称“所有交易数据使用 SM4 加密传输”,但 README 中接口请求示例仅展示明文业务字段,未说明哪些字段被加密、如何封装、何处验签或如何防重放。这种安全表述与实现细节不一致,容易让使用者误以为敏感数据已得到端到端保护,实际却可能以明文或不可验证的方式发送。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The module docstring and function docstrings are written entirely in Chinese, which imposes a specific language context without any indication of user opt-in or locale-specific scope. Under the language/locale policy rule, this is a natural-language policy concern because the file does not offer an alternative language or explain that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-speaking context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.