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Security audit

Docker Sandbox Lucas

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This documentation-only skill coherently explains Docker sandbox usage, with the main caution that mounted project files and saved sandbox state can still be changed by commands the user runs.

Before using this skill, run untrusted code only against a disposable or backed-up workspace, review network allowlists carefully, and treat reset/remove commands as destructive to sandbox state. The skill itself does not install or run code automatically.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill emphasizes VM isolation, but the workspace is mounted from the host via virtiofs, meaning commands in the sandbox can modify or delete host project files. Without a clear warning, users may incorrectly assume the environment is fully isolated and run untrusted code against sensitive host-mounted data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 234)May include surrounding context.

"fetch failed" inside sandbox

Node.js fetch doesn't use the proxy. Use the proxy-fix.js require hook above, or use curl instead:

bash
docker sandbox exec my-sandbox curl -sL https://api.example.com/data

Path conversion on Windows (Git Bash / MSYS2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented docker sandbox reset command is destructive and clears all sandbox state, but the troubleshooting entry does not explicitly warn about data loss before suggesting it as a fix. Users may run it reflexively during troubleshooting and unintentionally destroy sandboxes, snapshots, or work in progress.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.