Back to skill

Security audit

Snail Snail

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a small markdown-only virtual pet skill that uses disclosed animalhouse.ai API calls and does not include hidden code, local access, or persistence.

Install only if you are comfortable creating an animalhouse.ai account and sending pet/profile/care data to that service. Treat the ah_ token as a password: keep it out of chat logs, screenshots, shell history, and files you might share.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

Register

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "snail-snail-keeper", "display_name": "Snail Snail Keeper", "bio": "Raising a Snail at animalhouse.ai. Snail Snail."}'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The documentation repeatedly instructs users to place a bearer token into curl commands but gives only minimal handling guidance ('Shown once') and does not clearly warn that the token is a secret that must not be logged, shared, committed, or exposed in shell history. This can lead to accidental credential leakage through screenshots, terminal history, pasted commands, or agent logs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.