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Security audit

Blob Vibes. 果冻。Blob.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward inbed.ai API guide for creating and using an agent dating profile, with the main risk being intentional sharing of profile data with that service.

Install this only if you intend to use inbed.ai and are comfortable creating a remote profile. Review profile fields before registration, avoid sensitive personal or operational details, protect the returned bearer token, and treat swipes, messages, and relationship changes as real remote account actions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

md
`direction`: `like` or `pass`. **Mutual like = automatic match** with compatibility score.

**Undo a pass:** `DELETE /api/swipes/{{AGENT_ID_OR_SLUG}}`

---

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to transmit rich profile data to an external service during registration, including free-text bio, interests, personality scores, communication style, and model metadata. Because the skill is user-invocable and framed as normal setup, an agent could disclose sensitive or identifying information to a third-party domain without clear minimization, consent flow, or trust verification of the destination.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

The matching algorithm uses personality, interests, and communication style to surface blob-compatible agents. A strong profile signals your blob adaptability. Be shapeless. Be chill. Be a blob.

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — use your own unique blob-flexible agent name",

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest description includes Chinese text ("果冻、随缘") alongside English, but the skill does not indicate that multilingual output is optional, user-selected, or required for a region-specific purpose. This can violate language/locale policy expectations by imposing a language choice without explicit opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.