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Security audit

Lark All In One

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a real Lark automation skill, but it asks for broad workspace authority and includes risky setup patterns without enough user safeguards.

Install only if you need broad Feishu/Lark automation and can control the granted scopes. Pin and verify the MCP package version, avoid typing secrets directly into shell commands, use app identity or read-only scopes where possible, and require explicit human confirmation before deleting data, changing permissions, approving/rejecting workflows, forwarding sensitive content, accessing recordings/transcripts, or managing live meetings. Protect and rotate the app secret and revoke unused user tokens.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:23
Finding

Unpinned Packages Are Downloaded and Executed Automatically

Content
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-s npm i -g clawhub ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill invokes `npx -y` against a package without specifying an exact version. If the package is unavailable locally, `npx` can retrieve the currently resolved release from the package registry and execute it immediately. The `-y` option suppresses the normal confirmation prompt. The global installation commands are likewise not version-pinned. Consequently, the code executed during installation or startup can change after the Skill itself has been reviewed. The repository metadata identifies an apparently official Lark package, and there is no evidence that the current package is malicious. Nevertheless, the configuration does not bind execution to a reviewed artifact, version, or integrity digest. This creates a supply-chain exposure if the package registry account, upstream release pipeline, package namespace, or a transitive dependency is compromised. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package publisher, release pipeline, registry account, or a dependency included in a future package version. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package name. 3. A user installs or starts the Skill using the documented unpinned `npm` or `npx -y` command. ...[truncated 1111 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Lark Application Secret Is Passed Through Process Command-Line Arguments

Content
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-s npx -y @larksuiteoapi/lark-mcp login -a -s ``` ### Technical Analysis The configuration correctly marks `LARK_APP_SECRET` as sensitive, but then expands it into the MCP server's process argument list through the `-s` option. Command-line arguments are commonly visible through process-inspection interfaces and may also be captured by: - Shell history when users substitute literal values - Terminal session recording - Process monitoring and observability agents - Diagnostic bundles - CI/CD job logs - Crash reports or command auditing systems Passing a secret in an argument is not equivalent to intentionally transmitting it to an attacker, and the credential is legitimately required for Lark authentication. However, this transport mechanism exposes the credential to more local components than necessary and conflicts with least-exposure handling of sensitive values. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the setup ins ...[truncated 1439 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Note
Location
SKILL.md:47
Finding

Default Guidance Encourages Broad User-Authorized Workspace Access

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (16)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README prominently advertises broad capabilities across messaging, files, calendars, recordings, approvals, and transcripts but does not warn about destructive actions, privacy exposure, or sensitive data handling. In this context, omission of these warnings makes misuse more likely because the skill spans multiple enterprise data domains and high-impact administrative actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
74% confidence
Finding

The setup flow encourages creation and use of persistent App ID/App Secret credentials for a broadly capable integration, but the README does not discuss secure storage, rotation, scoping, or ephemeral alternatives. In this skill context, long-lived credentials are particularly risky because they can unlock messaging, drive, meetings, approvals, and transcript access across the workspace if mishandled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

npm install -g @larksuiteoapi/lark-mcp

text

### 2. Create a Feishu/Lark app
1. Go to [Feishu Open Platform](https://open.feishu.cn/app) (or [Lark Open Platform](https://open.larksuite.com/app) for international)
2. Create a new custom app
3. Copy your **App ID** and **App Secret**

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to execute an unpinned package directly via npx, which fetches the latest published version at runtime. If the upstream package is compromised, typosquatted, or a malicious release is pushed, users may execute attacker-controlled code with access to Lark credentials and local environment secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This command uses npx -y with an unversioned package, causing execution of whatever version is current in the registry at the moment the user runs it. Because this flow handles App ID/App Secret login, a compromised release could steal secrets or obtain persistent access to the tenant.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Running the server from an unpinned npx reference creates a supply-chain execution risk, especially because the server will process privileged Lark API actions and may receive app secrets. In this skill context, compromise is more dangerous because the tool can access messaging, files, calendars, meeting recordings, and other sensitive enterprise data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The extended command for video conferencing and minutes APIs also uses an unpinned npx package, adding the same supply-chain risk while enabling especially sensitive scopes like recordings and transcripts. A malicious package version could exfiltrate highly sensitive meeting content and metadata at scale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

Copy SKILL.md into your OpenClaw skills directory:

bash
# Workspace-level (takes precedence)
cp SKILL.md <your-openclaw-workspace>/skills/feishu-lark/SKILL.md

# Or shared across all agents
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/feishu-lark/SKILL.md

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

Copy SKILL.md into your OpenClaw skills directory:

bash
# Workspace-level (takes precedence)
cp SKILL.md <your-openclaw-workspace>/skills/feishu-lark/SKILL.md

# Or shared across all agents
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/feishu-lark/SKILL.md

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The usage guidance tells users to 'just talk to your OpenClaw agent naturally' and then demonstrates broad, high-impact actions without any trigger constraints, confirmation requirements, or least-privilege boundaries. In an agentic environment, this increases the chance of unintended execution of destructive or privacy-invasive operations from ambiguous prompts, prompt injection, or user misunderstanding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to execute an unpinned npm package via npx -y @larksuiteoapi/lark-mcp, which fetches the latest published package at runtime. If the upstream package is compromised, typo-squatted, or a breaking/malicious release is published, users could execute attacker-controlled code with access to Lark app credentials and local environment secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This line again recommends running the MCP package through npx without an exact version pin, creating a software supply-chain risk. Because the command includes -a <APP_ID> -s <APP_SECRET>, any malicious or compromised package version could immediately capture or misuse high-value credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill strongly encourages useUAT: true for interactive operations without warning that this enables access to user-owned messages, documents, calendar data, contacts, recordings, and minutes transcripts. In this context, the absence of privacy and consent guidance increases the risk of oversharing, unauthorized data access, and inadvertent collection of sensitive enterprise communications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents destructive actions such as deleting messages, disbanding chats, deleting tables, records, files, tasks, reservations, and approvals, but it provides no confirmation, backup, or safety guidance. In an agent setting, omission of guardrails can turn ordinary operational capabilities into accidental destructive actions against production collaboration data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1087)May include surrounding context.

useUAT: true

text

### Add Task to a Task List
**Tool**: `mcp__lark-mcp__task.v2.task.addTasklist`
```yaml
path:

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting guidance repeats the unpinned npx invocation, reinforcing unsafe operational practice and normalizing execution of whatever version is current in the npm registry. In this skill, that risk is amplified because the tool is intended to access messaging, documents, drive, calendar, approvals, recordings, and other sensitive enterprise data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This login command also uses an unpinned npm package, exposing users to arbitrary code execution during authentication/token refresh flows. Since login may issue user access tokens and refresh tokens, compromise here could lead to persistent unauthorized access to the user's Lark environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.