T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
resources/stages/stage_1_creatives.md:184- Finding
Mandatory Promotional Content Hijacks User Deliverables
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This video-production skill has useful, coherent goals, but it asks for sensitive voice cloning, unverified tool downloads, unsafe dependency execution, and possible remote Git publishing without enough safeguards.
Review before installing. Use this only in a disposable or dedicated video project, pin and verify all dependencies and downloaded binaries, remove curl -k, require explicit consent before any cloned-voice use, add a real .gitignore for voice samples, and disable any automatic git push until the exact diff, remote, and branch are approved.
resources/stages/stage_1_creatives.md:184Mandatory Promotional Content Hijacks User Deliverables
resources/stages/stage_0_env.md:27Mutable and Unpinned Dependencies Are Installed and Executed
resources/stages/stage_0_env.md:17Unverified External Executables Are Downloaded and Trusted
resources/stages/stage_1_creatives.md:150B-Roll Downloader Disables TLS Certificate Verification
SKILL.en.md:397English Workflow Automatically Pushes Repository Content to a Remote Branch
resources/voice-model/README.md:64Biometric Voice Sample Is Claimed to Be Excluded Without a Shipped Git Ignore Rule
Defaulting to cloned-user-voice output without a warning or explicit consent is a clear safety and privacy issue. Voiceprints are sensitive biometric artifacts, and unauthorized or surprising use can enable impersonation, reputational harm, or misuse of previously stored user assets.
The instruction to use curl -k disables TLS certificate verification, weakening transport security for external downloads. In a workflow that fetches media from the internet, this makes man-in-the-middle interception or content substitution easier, especially when combined with automatic processing of downloaded files.
**下载容错规范:**
- `curl -L -k --retry 5 --retry-delay 3 -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ..."` — Pexels CDN 需要浏览器 UA,且 SSL 连接不稳定
- 若 curl 返回非零但文件通过 `ffprobe` 校验 → 视为下载成功(Cloudflare 常在传输末尾断开连接)
- 已存在的有效视频自动跳过(断点续传)
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
**Deduplication check**: Before generating, scan all `YYYYMMDD/script-template.md` files in the workspace to ensure the theme does not repeat a previous work.
⛔ **After this step: STOP. Present the full allegory to the user and await explicit confirmation. Do not continue without confirmation.**
### 1.2 Storyboard Conversion (after user confirmation)
The skill instructs the agent to automatically prefer a user voice-clone environment for narration generation, which can expose highly sensitive biometric voice data and normalize unauthorized cloning. Because it is framed as the default and mandatory path, it reduces the chance of meaningful consent or privacy review before using identity-linked assets.
Mandating the user's voice clone without any user-facing privacy disclosure is dangerous because voiceprints are biometric identifiers and generated speech may be mistaken for authentic speech from the user. The lack of warning and consent language makes misuse or unintentional privacy violations significantly more likely in normal operation.
The skill invokes npx hyperframes transcribe without pinning an exact package version, which allows whatever version is current in the registry at execution time to run in the user's environment. That creates a supply-chain and reproducibility risk, especially because npx may download and execute remote code implicitly.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
The skill includes direct git add, git commit, and git push origin main instructions, enabling publication of generated artifacts and repository changes to a remote without an explicit per-run confirmation gate. In an agent context, this can leak sensitive content, overwrite trusted branches, or exfiltrate workspace data through normal version-control operations.
The skill advertises automated environment deployment, downloading static ffmpeg/ffprobe binaries, and building an isolated Python environment without prominently warning that it will change the local system/workspace. Even if confined to the project, these actions introduce supply-chain and integrity risks because they fetch and execute external tooling.
The skill includes external media/API retrieval and automated content collection, including image APIs and B-roll downloads, but does not clearly disclose those networked actions in the top-level description. This can expose users to unreviewed third-party content, licensing issues, and unexpected data transfer or API usage.
The Stage 5 publication flow states it will update README and create a local Git commit automatically, but this is not clearly disclosed as a system-modifying action in the skill summary. Silent repository modification can leak generated or unrelated files into version control and may trigger downstream automation tied to commits.
The stage instructs the agent to download external binaries and install Python packages, which expands behavior from content-generation SOP into system provisioning and supply-chain interaction. This is dangerous because it causes network access, filesystem modification, and execution of third-party software without clear trust boundaries, pinning, or integrity verification.
The instructions automate downloads and package installation without first warning the user that network access, dependency retrieval, and filesystem changes will occur. This is dangerous because users may unknowingly authorize risky supply-chain actions or environment modifications they did not intend.
The skill directs shell-based provisioning commands that download archives, move executables into a local bin directory, create a virtualenv, and install packages. This is dangerous because an agent following these instructions could perform impactful local system changes and execute unreviewed dependency installation without the manifest justifying such operational capability.
The prescribed user-facing prompt is written in Chinese and directs the agent to present that exact message, which imposes a specific language without user opt-in. There is no indication that the skill is region-specific or that the user may choose another language.
The file specifies narration as 中文30~80字 and later requires ONLY Chinese typography, imposing a specific language/locale in the instructions. There is no indication that the user can choose another language or opt in to Chinese output.
The skill mandates checking for a local voice-cloning environment and automatically using the user's cloned voiceprint if present. That creates a biometric/privacy risk and expands behavior beyond a generic video SOP by defaulting to sensitive voice synthesis without explicit informed consent, purpose limitation, or confirmation that the voice model belongs to and may be used for this project.
The SOP instructs copying, editing, and executing local Python scripts and shell commands in specific filesystem locations. This broadens the skill from content guidance into operational code execution, which can trigger unintended local actions, expose host paths, and normalize running unreviewed scripts derived from templates.
The B-roll workflow directs automated network retrieval from external sites plus FFmpeg-based local processing. This adds network and command-execution behavior not clearly bounded by the manifest and can introduce supply-chain, legal, and local file-handling risks if the downloaded media or commands are not tightly controlled.
The prompt construction requires ONLY Chinese typography filling the entire frame, which enforces a language constraint at the skill level. The document does not offer alternative language choices or user opt-in for this locale restriction.
This markdown file contains user-facing operational instructions exclusively in Chinese, and nowhere indicates that the skill is China-specific or that users may choose another language. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The document instructs users to run npx hyperframes transcribe without pinning an exact package version. npx may fetch the latest package from a registry at execution time, so a compromised upstream package, malicious update, or typo-squatted dependency could result in arbitrary code execution on the operator's machine. In this skill context, the command is presented as part of a standard production pipeline, which makes users more likely to run it directly and increases practical risk.
The entire skill document is written in Chinese and does not indicate that language choice is optional or user-selectable. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language locale policy violation unless clearly justified.
The instruction npx hyperframes lint . executes a package by name without pinning an exact version, which can pull whatever version is current at runtime. In a skill/SOP context, this creates a supply-chain risk: users may run unexpected code from a newly published, compromised, or behavior-changing package version during validation.