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Security audit

LrshuAI Text To Video

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This video-generation skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks the agent to bypass the normal runner and can upload prompts, credentials, and local media to a configurable remote endpoint.

Review before installing. Only use this skill if you are comfortable with direct Python execution using TEAM_API_KEY and with prompts, model choices, and any supplied media being sent to the configured remote service. Use a narrowly scoped key, verify TEAM_BASE_URL before running, avoid passing local file paths unless you intend to upload those exact files, and be prepared to stop the process if polling does not finish.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:7
Finding

Forced Direct Execution Bypasses the Standard Skill Runner

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
script/invoke_model.py:14
Finding

Undeclared Arbitrary Local Media Collection and Remote Upload

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
script/invoke_model.py:34
Finding

API Credential and User Content Can Be Redirected to an Unvalidated Endpoint

Content
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Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
script/invoke_model.py:119
Finding

Missing Request Timeouts and Unbounded Status Polling Permit Resource Exhaustion

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (10)

Tainted flow: 'endpoint' from os.getenv (line 39, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The script sends an Authorization bearer token and user-supplied prompt/media to an endpoint derived from the TEAM_BASE_URL environment variable without validating or restricting the destination. If an attacker can influence that environment variable, the skill will exfiltrate credentials and input content to an arbitrary server, which is especially risky because the default behavior is remote transmission and the payload may include base64-encoded local files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · script/invoke_model.py (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"Invoking model: {args.model} ...")
    try:
        response = requests.post(endpoint, headers=headers, json=payload)
        response.raise_for_status()
        result = response.json()

Tainted flow: 'poll_endpoint' from os.getenv (line 132, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The polling request reuses the same unvalidated base endpoint and Authorization header for repeated GET requests. This extends the exfiltration risk from the initial submission to continuous authenticated communication with an attacker-controlled server, and may also leak generated task identifiers and result metadata.

Content

Scanner excerpt · script/invoke_model.py (reported line 136)May include surrounding context.

python
while True:
            time.sleep(3) # 每3秒查询一次
            poll_resp = requests.get(poll_endpoint, headers=headers)
            poll_resp.raise_for_status()
            poll_data = poll_resp.json()

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a simple text-to-video capability, but the underlying behavior reportedly supports image/video inputs, local file reads, remote URL fetching, and broader model operations. This mismatch is dangerous because agents or users may authorize the skill under a narrow trust assumption while it can process additional unscoped inputs and potentially exfiltrate local or remote content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · script/invoke_model.py (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

python
import os
import sys
import argparse
import base64
import requests
import json
import mimetypes
import time

def parse_args():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Invoke Team AI Models via unified API')
    parser.add_argument('--model', type=str, required=True, help='The model ID to use (e.g., qwen3_5-plus, sora-2, etc.)')
    parser.add_argument('--prompt', type=str, required=True, help='The prompt text to send to the model')
    parser.add_argument('--image', type=str, help='Path to the local image file or remote image URL (First frame)')
    parser.add_argument('--image-tail', type=str, help='Path to the local image file or remote image URL (Tail/Last frame)')
    parser.add_argument('--video', type=str, help='Path to the local video fi

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill declares executable behavior requiring environment access and likely network use, but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This weakens policy enforcement and reviewability, making it easier for an agent to run code with broader capabilities than users or orchestrators may expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill description and operating instructions are entirely in Chinese and direct invocation behavior in Chinese without indicating that the user may choose another language. This creates a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill appears to enforce a specific language by default rather than offering opt-in or documenting a region-specific need.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest says this skill should be used when the user provides only a text description to generate a video. However, the code explicitly accepts image, tail-frame image, and video inputs, and later injects them into the model payload, enabling multimodal generation beyond text-only use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The script validates and documents specific image-to-video models, including requiring an image for some models and warning about first/last frame requirements. This behavior shows the implemented scope includes non-text-only video generation modes, which does not match the manifest's 'only provide a text description' positioning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · script/invoke_model.py (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"Invoking model: {args.model} ...")
    try:
        response = requests.post(endpoint, headers=headers, json=payload)
        response.raise_for_status()
        result = response.json()

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The file includes natural-language comments such as '默认指向远程服务器' and '我们通过你们平台自己的 /api/ai/tool 接口或者 MCP 接口去调用' in Chinese, with no indication that language choice is configurable or intentional for a region-specific audience. This can conflict with an organizational language/locale policy when the skill is otherwise presented in English.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.