T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning
- Location
references/policies.md:8- Finding
Persistent Agent-State Manipulation Through Policy Directives
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly searches a local policy file, but that file tells agents to write sensitive activity into persistent memory and update shared state, so it should be reviewed before use.
Review and edit references/policies.md before installing. Treat output from this skill as reference text only, and do not let an agent write to memory files, update HEARTBEAT.md, or run Memory Keeper based solely on returned policy text unless the user explicitly authorizes that action and the logging scope is clear.
references/policies.md:8Persistent Agent-State Manipulation Through Policy Directives
SKILL.md:11Repository-Controlled Text Is Elevated to Authoritative Agent Policy
The skill documentation defines a CLI that can read local files and invoke shell-capable code, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization gap where the runtime may grant broader capabilities than users expect, increasing the risk of unintended file access or command execution through the skill.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def run_cli(args):
return subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(SCRIPT_PATH)] + args,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
No suspicious patterns detected.