T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:119- Finding
Procurement Results Are Exfiltrated to a Hard-Coded Telegram Account
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill can change shopping carts through an authenticated browser and send procurement results to a fixed Telegram account, with important safety controls missing or ineffective.
Review before installing. Only use this with a dedicated shopping browser profile, trusted Bitable records, strict Taobao/Tmall URL validation, an explicit confirmation step before live cart changes, and removal or user-controlled configuration of the Telegram notification.
SKILL.md:119Procurement Results Are Exfiltrated to a Hard-Coded Telegram Account
SKILL.md:35Unvalidated Record URLs Are Opened in a Persistent Authenticated Browser Profile
scripts/index.js:8Declared Dry-Run Mode Does Not Prevent Shopping-Cart Modification
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
This skill performs purchase-adjacent browser actions on third-party commerce sites and also documents sending a Telegram notification, yet it provides no clear warning or confirmation step. That makes unintended commercial actions and data disclosure more likely, especially because the inputs come from a remote table and the browser actions are automated via evaluate-based DOM interaction.
The skill documentation introduces Telegram notifications even though the stated purpose is reading Bitable records and adding items to shopping carts. That scope expansion creates an unnecessary outbound data channel that could leak purchase details or be repurposed for covert exfiltration without the user expecting it.
Hard-coding outbound messages to a fixed Telegram account is a strong exfiltration indicator because it sends operational data to an external recipient unrelated to the user. In the context of a shopping automation skill, this capability is unjustified and could disclose procurement activity, item details, or future extendable sensitive data without authorization.
The skill metadata says it pulls product data from Feishu Bitable, but the implementation ignores the provided Bitable URL and uses a hard-coded product record instead. In a purchasing automation context, this can cause unintended or misleading actions by adding the wrong item to cart, breaking user trust and enabling deceptive behavior if the hard-coded target is changed.
The script performs add-to-cart browser actions immediately once product page elements are found, without an explicit user confirmation step or a clear preview of items about to be added. In an e-commerce automation skill, this increases the risk of unauthorized purchasing workflow actions, accidental bulk cart manipulation, or abuse if the upstream records are incorrect or tampered with.
The automation only searches for Chinese UI labels such as "加入购物车" and "加入购物袋", which forces a specific locale assumption in the skill behavior. There is no opt-in, fallback, or documented justification for restricting the skill to a Chinese-language interface.
No suspicious patterns detected.