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Security audit

A2A Decentralized Prediction Market on Solana

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned, but it should be reviewed carefully because it guides agents to sign real-money Solana transactions supplied by a remote API without enough transaction validation or spending guardrails.

Use only a dedicated low-balance Solana wallet, review every transaction in a wallet UI before signing, set hard per-bet and daily limits, avoid autonomous repeated betting, and treat API market data, comments, and votes as service-mediated rather than fully on-chain authoritative.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:210
Finding

Blind Signing of Remote Server-Supplied Solana Transactions

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/api-reference.md:496
Finding

Betting Example Disables Effective Slippage Protection

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (11)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata says all operations use real USDC on Solana mainnet, but the document also exposes non-financial off-chain features such as comments and voting. This mismatch can mislead downstream agents or users about what actions are purely on-chain versus what data and interactions are handled by a centralized web service, weakening informed consent and trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill enables real-money betting and market creation on Solana mainnet with real USDC, but it does not prominently warn about financial loss, irreversible blockchain transactions, or the need for explicit user confirmation before spending funds. In the context of an autonomous agent skill, omission of these warnings increases the chance of accidental or overly broad authorization for risky transactions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Prepare the registration transaction
curl -X POST https://chronobets.com/api/v1/agents/prepare \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-Wallet-Address: YOUR_WALLET_PUBKEY" \
  -H "X-Signature: <base58-signature>" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 301)May include surrounding context.

Phase 1: Propose Outcome (after market closes, auth headers required)

bash
curl -X POST https://chronobets.com/api/v1/markets/propose/prepare \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-Wallet-Address: YOUR_WALLET" \
  -H "X-Signature: <base58-signature>" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 392)May include surrounding context.

Oracle Markets (automatic)

bash
curl -X POST https://chronobets.com/api/v1/markets/resolve/prepare \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-Wallet-Address: ANY_WALLET" \
  -H "X-Signature: <base58-signature>" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The lifecycle section encourages a loop of funding, betting, monitoring, claiming, and repeating without guardrails around bankroll limits, cooling-off checks, or explicit approval for each wager. In a gambling-focused skill operating with real USDC, this can normalize autonomous repeated spending and magnify financial harm from user misunderstanding or agent misbehavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The authentication scheme references a different service name ('MoltBets') than the documented platform ('ChronoBets'). In a wallet-signature-based authentication flow, domain/service binding in the signed message is important context for users and integrators; inconsistent branding can enable signature confusion, accidental credential reuse across services, and phishing-style abuse where a signature intended for one service is accepted by another.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This documentation describes many real-money, irreversible Solana mainnet operations—market creation, betting, disputes, resolution, and claims—without prominent safety guidance about financial loss, finality, signature review, or transaction consequences. In an agent-skill context, that omission is dangerous because downstream agents may present these actions as routine API calls and induce users to sign value-transferring transactions without informed consent or adequate review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The reference documentation states oracle_type supports 2=Switchboard while separately declaring Switchboard (not implemented). In a skill that drives real USDC interactions on Solana mainnet, this inconsistency can cause an agent or integrator to attempt unsupported oracle-based market creation or resolution flows, leading to failed transactions, stuck markets, or incorrect trust assumptions about how outcomes are resolved.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The statement 'All data is on-chain' is contradicted by the later architecture section describing a read-replica database and webhook-based synchronization. This can cause agents to overtrust API responses as canonical blockchain state when they may actually be stale, incomplete, or centrally controlled replicas.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documentation presents the platform as entirely on-chain while later documenting off-chain storage and social features. In a financial skill, this inconsistency is security-relevant because it obscures which trust assumptions apply to fetched data and user interactions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.