rez-package-definition

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Oct 1, 2026 · 6:28 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

This skill is documentation for writing Rez package definitions and does not contain hidden execution, persistence, or data-exfiltration behavior.

Install only if you want Rez package.py authoring guidance. Treat the subprocess example as illustrative and prefer safer subprocess argument lists in real packages, especially if any command input could become dynamic.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

This duplicate finding points to the same shell-based subprocess usage. The code is not directly malicious, but it demonstrates an unsafe invocation style that can become dangerous when reused or adapted, especially because shell metacharacter parsing is enabled by shell=True. Since this skill is instructional content for writing package definitions, unsafe examples are more dangerous than isolated application code because they can propagate insecure patterns across many package files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

md

@early()
def authors():
    import subprocess
    p = subprocess.Popen("git shortlog -sn | cut -f2",
                         shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
    out, _ = p.communicate()
    return out.strip().split("\n")

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

This duplicate finding points to the same shell-based subprocess usage. The code is not directly malicious, but it demonstrates an unsafe invocation style that can become dangerous when reused or adapted, especially because shell metacharacter parsing is enabled by shell=True. Since this skill is instructional content for writing package definitions, unsafe examples are more dangerous than isolated application code because they can propagate insecure patterns across many package files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

md

@early()
def authors():
    import subprocess
    p = subprocess.Popen("git shortlog -sn | cut -f2",
                         shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
    out, _ = p.communicate()
    return out.strip().split("\n")

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.