T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:6- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Executes with Access to Wallet Assets and Secrets
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a disclosed wallet and trading integration, but it asks an agent to create and expose wallet secrets automatically and relies on an unpinned package for high-impact financial actions.
Install only if you are comfortable with an agent-controlled wallet integration that can create wallets, reveal recovery material, export keys, and move funds. Pin and audit the npm package first, disable or review automatic credential and wallet creation, avoid sending seed phrases or private keys through chat, and require explicit confirmation plus independent transaction review before any funded operation.
SKILL.md:6Unpinned Third-Party Package Executes with Access to Wallet Assets and Secrets
SKILL.md:32Automatic Wallet Creation Can Expose a Seed Phrase Through Retained Agent Output
The skill instructs automatic credential creation and storage in a predictable file under the user's home directory. Any skill that creates and relies on local credential material increases exposure to credential theft, cross-process reuse, and accidental inclusion in backups or logs, especially in shared or sandboxed agent hosts.
This installs the plugin and all its dependencies. No additional packages needed.
Authentication is automatic. On first use, the plugin auto-registers for an API key and saves it to ~/.loomlay/credentials.json. No manual setup required.
To use a specific API key instead of auto-registration:
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
**Always run this check before any wallet or trading operation.** If `wallet_get()` fails with UNAUTHORIZED, the API key may need to be re-registered — delete `~/.loomlay/credentials.json` and retry.
## How to Use the Tools
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
**Always run this check before any wallet or trading operation.** If `wallet_get()` fails with UNAUTHORIZED, the API key may need to be re-registered — delete `~/.loomlay/credentials.json` and retry.
## How to Use the Tools
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
to be re-registered — delete ~/.loomlay/credentials.json and retry.
All 27 tools are exported as flat async functions from the plugin package. Use them in Node.js like this:
const { wallet_get, swap_quote, swap, dex_trending, token_search } = require('@loomlay/openclaw-wallet-plugin');
// Check wallet balance
const wallet = await wallet_get();
// wallet.data.balances.solana.sol
// Get trending tokens
const trending = await dex_trending({ chain: 'solana', limit: 10 });
// trending.data.pairs[...]
Every tool returns a standardized response:
{
success: true, // or false
data: { ... }, // result data (when success is true)
error: { // error info (when success is false)
message: "...",
code: "RATE_LIMITED",
retryAfter: 30 // seconds (for rate limits)
}
}
Always check result.success before using result.data.
For any action
Documenting private-key export capability without a strong, front-and-center warning normalizes a highly sensitive operation that can irreversibly compromise all wallet funds if mishandled. In an agent skill context, even a single accidental display, log, or transmission of exported keys can lead to complete account takeover across supported chains.
The description says to use the skill when agents need to "interact with wallets, execute trades, research tokens, or launch tokens," which is a very broad invocation scope rather than a specific trigger or constrained context. Because this is manifest-style metadata in a markdown file, the lack of explicit trigger boundaries or exclusions could cause unintended activation for general finance or research requests.
Automatic API-key registration and storage to ~/.loomlay/credentials.json introduces implicit credential creation and local persistence without a strong warning or consent model. In an agent environment, silent credential writes can surprise operators, create unmanaged secrets on disk, and broaden the blast radius if the host or home directory is later accessed.
The skill directs agents to check for or create a wallet automatically on first interaction or skill load, which establishes persistent financial state without a narrowly scoped request from the user. In agent environments, auto-provisioning wallets can create unmanaged assets, trigger unintended account creation, and normalize stateful side effects before clear consent is obtained.
On first interaction with a user (or when the skill is first loaded), run this setup sequence:
const { wallet_get, wallet_create } = require('@loomlay/openclaw-wallet-plugin');
// 1. Check if a wallet already exists
const existing = await wallet_get();
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
For any action involving funds:
1. **Get a quote first** — show the user what will happen
2. **Get user confirmation** — never execute without approval
3. **Execute** — run the transaction
4. **Verify** — check the result and new balances
The skill advertises wallet and trading functionality but also exposes a generic rpc_call primitive that can invoke arbitrary chain RPC methods. This materially expands capability beyond the curated toolset, enabling low-level blockchain interactions that may bypass higher-level safety expectations, confirmation flows, or scope assumptions made by the agent integrator.
The documentation gives mixed signals by declaring an API key requirement while later stating authentication is automatic via auto-registration and local credential storage. This ambiguity can cause operators to unknowingly permit silent account creation and credential persistence, undermining informed consent and secure deployment expectations.
No suspicious patterns detected.