T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- scripts/monitor.py:108
- Finding
- Incomplete Command-Line Redaction May Expose Process Secrets## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/monitor.py`, lines 108–130 **Vulnerability Type**: Sensitive information exposure through incomplete redaction **Risk Level**: Medium ```python def sanitize_cmdline(cmdline: str) -> str: """Redact sensitive patterns from command lines.""" cmdline = re.sub(r'((?:token|key|secret|password|apikey|api_key|access_token)=)\S+', r'\1***', cmdline, flags=re.IGNORECASE) cmdline = re.sub(r'(--(?:token|key|password|secret|api-key))\s+\S+', r'\1 ***', cmdline, flags=re.IGNORECASE) return cmdline def get_top_processes(n=5): try: result = subprocess.run( ["ps", "aux", "--sort=-pcpu"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5 ) procs = [] for line in result.stdout.strip().splitlines()[1:n+1]: parts = line.split(None, 10) if len(parts) >= 11: cmd = sanitize_cmdline(parts[10]) procs.append({ "user": parts[0], "pid": parts[1], "cpu": parts[2], "mem": parts[3], "rss_mb": round(int(parts[5]) / 1024, 1), "command": cmd[:60], }) return procs ``` ### Technical Analysis The monitor obtains system process information through `ps aux`, including usernames and complete command-line arguments. It then attempts to redact credentials using a denylist of selected parameter names. This redaction is incomplete because it only recognizes a limited set of exact patterns. Sensitive values can remain visible when supplied through: - Unrecognized options such as `--client-secret`, `--auth-token`, `--credential`, or `--private-key`. - Short options such as `-p secret`. - Positional command-line arguments. - Authorization headers or connection strings. - Database, HTTP, or other URLs containi ...[truncated 2186 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not include complete process command lines in default output. Report only the executable or process name, such as the `comm` field. 2. Make command-line argument reporting an explicit opt-in feature with a clear warning that arguments can contain credentials and personal information. 3. Prefer allowlist-based output that exposes only known-safe process attributes instead of attempting to enumerate every possible sensitive parameter name. 4. If arguments must be displayed, redact or omit all argument values rather than relying solely on secret-name matching. 5. Consider using `ps` with a restricted output format, for example requesting PID, CPU, memory, and executable name without the full `args` field. 6. Apply data minimization to usernames and process identifiers when reports may be sent to group chats, logs, or external notification systems. 7. Add automated tests covering connection URLs, authorization headers, positional secrets, short options, alternative separators, and parameter-name variants. 8. Update `SKILL.md` to accurately warn that process metadata may be sensitive. Remove the unconditional claim that reports contain no tokens, paths, or user data unless this is technically enforced. 9. Run the monitor with the least-privileged account needed so operating-system process-visibility controls limit the available metadata.