Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent Baidu search and maps helper that sends user-provided queries and locations to Baidu, with no hidden persistence or destructive behavior found.
Install only if you are comfortable sending search terms, addresses, coordinates, and your Baidu API key to Baidu services. Avoid using it for highly sensitive locations unless that external sharing is acceptable.
The skill declares use of sensitive capabilities via environment credentials and external network access, but it does not explicitly constrain or document tool scope with permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch can lead to overbroad runtime access and weaker governance, making it harder for a platform to enforce least privilege or for reviewers to understand what the skill is permitted to do.
The activation guidance is broad enough to match many generic requests involving web search, travel planning, or nearby recommendations. Overly broad triggering can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly, sending user queries or location-related input to external services when a more specific skill selection step would be safer.
This code constructs an HTTP request containing the user's address data and transmits it to an external service for geocoding. While the network call is part of the tool's purpose, the file lacks any disclosure in usage text, comments, or prompts that entered locations will be sent to Baidu's servers.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
return None
url = (
f"https://api.map.baidu.com/geocoding/v3/?"
f"address={urllib.parse.quote(address)}"
f"&output=json&ak={ak}"
)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
return None
url = (
f"https://api.map.baidu.com/geocoding/v3/?"
f"address={urllib.parse.quote(address)}"
f"&output=json&ak={ak}"
)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
return None
url = (
f"https://api.map.baidu.com/geocoding/v3/?"
f"address={urllib.parse.quote(address)}"
f"&output=json&ak={ak}"
)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
return None
url = (
f"https://api.map.baidu.com/geocoding/v3/?"
f"address={urllib.parse.quote(address)}"
f"&output=json&ak={ak}"
)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
return None
url = (
f"https://api.map.baidu.com/geocoding/v3/?"
f"address={urllib.parse.quote(address)}"
f"&output=json&ak={ak}"
)
The request header hard-codes Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8, which imposes a specific language/locale preference. Under the policy, locale constraints should either be user-selectable or clearly justified as region-specific; this file does not provide such opt-in or justification.
The function reads BAIDU_API_KEY or BAIDU_AK from the environment, which is access to sensitive credential material. The code avoids printing the key, but there is no explicit user-facing warning or documentation in this file that the tool depends on and reads credentials from environment variables.
This file contains user-facing documentation, usage text, and runtime messages only in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on all users. Under the policy, forcing a language without an explicit choice or justified locale constraint is a natural-language policy violation.
No suspicious patterns detected.