T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:91- Finding
Command Injection Through Unsafe Campaign ID Substitution
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a purpose-aligned event lookup tool, but it uses unsafe shell-based instructions for user-provided activity IDs and has broad activation plus third-party API calls that need review.
Review before installing. The event lookup behavior itself is coherent, but the skill should narrow activation to explicit activity queries, clearly disclose that it contacts api.cumen.fun, and replace the node -e placeholder pattern with validated campaign IDs passed as safe process arguments or handled by a scoped HTTP tool.
SKILL.md:91Command Injection Through Unsafe Campaign ID Substitution
The activation criteria are overly broad because the skill can trigger on a mere mention of “友行” or “友行青年社群” without confirming the user is asking about events. That can cause unintended tool use and unnecessary disclosure of user prompts or query parameters to the external service, especially in conversations where the entity is mentioned incidentally.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
CLUB_ID = 018c32aa-7958-ede5-c6ae-403c9881a2a5
API_BASE = https://api.cumen.fun/api/xx.cumen.v1.CumenService
The skill performs external API requests but does not disclose that user-driven queries will be sent to a third-party domain. This creates a transparency and privacy risk because users may unknowingly cause conversation-derived data, such as requested campaign IDs or event lookups, to be transmitted outside the host system.
This code actively sends POST requests to a third-party service to retrieve club campaign data. In context, the danger is not the network call itself but that it can be invoked under broad triggers and without any user notice, leading to unintended external transmission of request data and metadata.
node -e "
const https = require('https');
const API = 'https://api.cumen.fun/api/xx.cumen.v1.CumenService/ListCampaignsOfClub';
const CLUB_ID = '018c32aa-7958-ede5-c6ae-403c9881a2a5';
function post(url, body) {
This code sends a campaign ID to an external service to fetch event details. While functionally aligned with the skill’s purpose, it still creates an external transmission path that can expose user-request-derived identifiers or usage patterns if invoked without clear intent and transparency.
node -e "
const https = require('https');
const API = 'https://api.cumen.fun/api/xx.cumen.v1.CumenService/GetCampaign';
const CAMPAIGN_ID = 'CAMPAIGN_ID';
function post(url, body) {