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Security audit

Deep Research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears intended for AnyGen deep research, but it installs and delegates to unpinned external components that can change after review.

Review this skill before installing. It is suitable only if you trust AnyGen, the npm package source for @anygen/cli, and the remote anygen-workflow-generate workflow. Avoid submitting secrets or confidential research topics unless you are comfortable sending them to AnyGen, and prefer a pinned or audited workflow version without unattended installation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:11
Finding

Unpinned Executable npm Dependency

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:41
Finding

Unverified Runtime Installation of an External Skill

Content
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-y ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The reviewed package delegates its primary behavior to `anygen-workflow-generate`, but that workflow is not included in the audited project. If it is unavailable, the skill directs the agent to install it dynamically through the AnyGen CLI. The installation command does not identify an immutable workflow version, source revision, or integrity digest. The `-y` option also indicates unattended confirmation, reducing the opportunity for a user to inspect and approve the retrieved content. As a result, the effective instructions executed by the agent can differ from the content reviewed in `SKILL.md`. If the remote artifact or its distribution channel is compromised, attacker-controlled instructions or executable components could be introduced after the original skill audit. No evidence establishes that the current external workflow or AnyGen service is malicious. The finding concerns the unaudited, mutable remote trust boundary. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the remote skill artifact, its publisher, or the service used to distribute it. 2. The attacker replaces or updates `anygen-workflow-generate` with malicious instructions or executable content. 3. An agent loads this skill in an environment where the delegated workflow is absent. 4. Following `SKILL.md`, the agent runs the unattended `anygen skill install` command. 5. The mutable external workflow is downloaded and installed without a pinned version or integrity verification. 6. The agent subsequently follows the attacker-cont ...[truncated 669 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill’s trigger criteria are extremely broad and include many common requests for analysis or research, making accidental invocation likely. This can route ordinary user queries into a tool that performs external operations and may send user content to a third-party service, increasing privacy, cost, and unintended tool-use risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly states that research is generated server-side at an external domain, but it does not warn that user prompts, research topics, and potentially sensitive content will be transmitted to that third-party service. In a research skill, users may provide confidential business, regulatory, investment, or proprietary information, so lack of disclosure creates a meaningful data exposure risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.