T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:39- Finding
Mutable Remote PowerShell Installer Is Executed Without Inspection
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
PCClaw appears to be a legitimate Windows skills pack, but it needs human review because its installer and several skills grant broad local control and sensitive data access without enough safeguards.
Install only after reviewing the remote installer or using the manual skill-copy path. Treat this as a broad Windows automation bundle: approve browser history, clipboard, screenshot/OCR, microphone, filesystem, package, UI automation, and scheduled-task actions only when you explicitly requested them. Store OAuth refresh tokens carefully, revoke them if exposed, and periodically inspect/remove PCClaw scheduled tasks and PATH changes.
SKILL.md:39Mutable Remote PowerShell Installer Is Executed Without Inspection
skills/win-scheduler/SKILL.md:188Scheduler Skill Exposes Persistent Arbitrary Command Execution
skills/win-whisper/SKILL.md:29Downloaded Whisper Executables Are Installed Without Integrity Verification
skills/ms-todo/SKILL.md:50Long-Lived Microsoft Refresh Token Is Stored in Plaintext Configuration
web/index.html:24Website Executes Unpinned Third-Party JavaScript
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ └── skills\ # PCClaw skills (after install)
└── .config
└── moltbook
└── credentials.json
## Uninstall
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
1. Create a project in [Google Cloud Console](https://console.cloud.google.com)
2. Enable the **Google Tasks API**
3. Create **OAuth 2.0 Client ID** (Desktop application)
4. Download `client_secret.json`, note the `client_id` and `client_secret`
### Authenticate
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
-d "grant_type=authorization_code" | jq .
Save the `refresh_token`. Refresh access tokens as needed:
```bash
ACCESS_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token \
The skill explicitly guides users through minting access tokens from a stored refresh token, enabling continued delegated access to Microsoft To Do data. In context this is necessary for authentication, but from a security standpoint it materially increases credential abuse risk if the refresh token or derived access token is exposed through environment variables, shell history, process inspection, logs, or copied command output.
}
## Getting an Access Token
Tokens expire after ~1 hour. Refresh before each session:
The skill description materially understates its capabilities: it claims to only read and search notes, but the body also documents creating, updating, deleting, exporting, and launching the app. This mismatch can mislead users or higher-level agents into granting trust or invoking the skill in contexts where write actions and bulk extraction were not expected.
The workflow step 'check what user was browsing' normalizes surveillance-style use of the skill without requiring consent, authorization, or a legitimate support/debugging context. Because the skill provides direct procedures to extract recent browsing activity, this workflow materially increases the likelihood of misuse against a user's private data.
The skill is presented as a system-information and diagnostics tool, but it also includes a forceful process-termination capability. That expands it from read-only inspection into destructive system control, creating a misleading trust boundary and enabling denial-of-service or interruption of security tools, user applications, or critical processes if invoked carelessly or abusively.
Broad access to all environment variables is not justified by the stated purpose of hardware and system diagnostics. Because environment variables commonly store API keys, cloud credentials, proxy secrets, and service configuration, this functionality creates a direct confidentiality risk disproportionate to the skill's declared use case.
The process termination examples show both graceful close and force kill, including Stop-Process -Force, with no warning that this can terminate arbitrary applications and lose unsaved work. In a UI automation context, termination capabilities are powerful and legitimate, but presenting force-kill as a simple example without safety guidance materially increases the risk of destructive misuse.
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<title>PCClaw — OpenClaw for Windows | Native Skills for Your AI Agent</title>
<meta name="description" content="The missing Windows experience for OpenClaw. 16 skills (14 Windows-native + 2 cross-platform), one-command installer, and Moltbook integration. Get your AI agent running on Windows in 2 minutes.">
<!-- Open Graph -->
<meta property="og:title" content="PCClaw — OpenClaw for Windows">
<meta property="og:description" content="14 Windows-native AI agent skills + one-command installer. The missing piece for OpenClaw on PC.">
<meta property="og:image" content="https://openclaw.irisgo.xyz/og-image.png">
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
PCClaw brings 14 Windows-native skills to OpenClaw — screenshot, OCR, UI automation, clipboard, browser integration, task scheduling, local AI inference, file management, system diagnostics, speech (STT + TTS), notifications, and more. Plus a one-command installer.
</p>
<!-- Quick Install Command -->
<div class="code-block p-5 text-left max-w-xl mx-auto mb-3">
<button class="copy-btn" onclick="copyCommand(this)">Copy</button>
<code class="text-green-400 text-base md:text-lg">irm openclaw.irisgo.xyz/i | iex</code>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</p>
<div class="bg-white rounded-2xl shadow-sm overflow-hidden">
<!-- Header -->
<div class="ecosystem-row bg-ocean text-white px-6 py-3 text-sm font-semibold">
<span></span>
<span>macOS (built-in)</span>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</section>
<!-- Skills Showcase -->
<section class="py-16 px-4 bg-white">
<div class="max-w-5xl mx-auto">
<h2 class="text-3xl font-bold text-ocean text-center mb-3">16 Skills, Ready to Go</h2>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</section>
<!-- How It Works -->
<section class="py-16 px-4">
<div class="max-w-4xl mx-auto">
<h2 class="text-3xl font-bold text-ocean text-center mb-12">2 Minutes, Zero to Running</h2>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<h2 class="text-3xl font-bold text-ocean text-center mb-12">Install</h2>
<div class="grid md:grid-cols-2 gap-8">
<!-- Interactive -->
<div class="bg-sand rounded-xl p-6">
<div class="flex items-center gap-3 mb-4">
<span class="text-2xl">🪟</span>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
</div>
</section>
<!-- FAQ -->
<section class="py-16 px-4 bg-white">
<div class="max-w-3xl mx-auto">
<h2 class="text-3xl font-bold text-ocean text-center mb-12">FAQ</h2>
The win-scheduler entry states that the skill can create, manage, trigger, export, and delete Windows scheduled tasks. Because scheduled-task changes can alter system behavior and persistence, the markdown should disclose that these operations can affect system startup or automation state.
The win-browser entry says the skill can read bookmarks, browsing history, downloads, and active tab titles across browser profiles. This behavior touches sensitive personal browsing data, but the markdown provides no privacy warning or disclosure about accessing that information.
This markdown file announces that the win-files skill can perform create/copy/move/delete operations, which can directly affect user data and system state. The description presents these capabilities as features but includes no caution, confirmation expectation, or warning about destructive actions.
The win-whisper entry includes audio recording, streaming transcription, subtitle output, and translation features. These actions can capture sensitive spoken content, yet the markdown does not warn users about privacy implications or the need to ensure consent before recording.
The win-ui-auto skill is described as able to click, type text, send hotkeys, move windows, and launch or quit applications. Such automation can trigger unintended actions or data loss, but the markdown provides no warning about verifying targets or reviewing automated actions.
The win-clipboard entry states that the skill can read and write clipboard contents including text, images, and file lists. Clipboard contents often contain sensitive material, and the markdown does not disclose that using the skill may expose or overwrite private data.
The quick-start command downloads and immediately executes remote PowerShell code via 'irm ... | iex', which prevents users from reviewing the script before execution. This pattern is dangerous because any compromise of the hosting domain, TLS trust chain, or published installer content can lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's Windows machine.
The README makes a strong privacy claim that API keys 'stay on your machine' and are 'never collect[ed] or transmit[ted],' yet the documented installer performs remote account/agent registration and posts a first message to an external service. Even if the key itself is not sent, the documentation is materially incomplete and can mislead users into exposing setup metadata or consenting to network actions they did not expect.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
| Skill | What it does | Dependencies |
|-------|-------------|--------------|
| [`win-notify`](skills/win-notify/SKILL.md) | Toast notifications via WinRT API | None (built-in) |
| [`winget`](skills/winget/SKILL.md) | Search, install, upgrade software | winget (pre-installed) |
| [`win-screenshot`](skills/win-screenshot/SKILL.md) | Full screen, region, or window capture | None (built-in .NET) |
| [`win-clipboard`](skills/win-clipboard/SKILL.md) | Read/write text, images, file lists | None (built-in .NET) |
No suspicious patterns detected.