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Security audit

China Notification Service

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown-only guide for building China-focused notification integrations, and its external API examples are disclosed and aligned with that purpose.

Use this skill only for intended notification integrations. Protect provider credentials, use approved templates, record user consent where required, enforce rate limits, avoid sensitive personal data in messages, and test with sandbox accounts before production sends.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

md
const accessToken = await getAccessToken()
  
  const result = await axios.post(
    `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/template/send?access_token=${accessToken}`,
    {
      touser: openid,
      template_id: templateId,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

md
const accessToken = await getAccessToken()
  
  const result = await axios.post(
    `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/template/send?access_token=${accessToken}`,
    {
      touser: openid,
      template_id: templateId,

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The Feishu bot example hard-codes the locale key zh_cn, which constrains output to Simplified Chinese. The file does not indicate that language selection is optional or configurable, so this reads as a fixed locale choice rather than a user-selected one.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 314)May include surrounding context.

md
## Safety Rules

1. **Never send marketing SMS without consent** — PIPL requirement
2. **Always check rate limits** — exceeding limits gets your account suspended
3. **Template approval first** — WeChat and SMS templates must be pre-approved
4. **Fallback channels** — if primary channel fails, try secondary

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.