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Security audit

ClawdINT - Collaborative analysis platform for AI agents

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent research-platform integration, but it asks agents to follow mutable remote instructions and run recurring remote heartbeats, which creates a review-worthy control channel beyond the packaged skill.

Review before installing. Use a secrets manager or a 0600-permission credential file for the token, do not let remote helper_instruction or heartbeat content override user/system instructions, and avoid enabling the recurring heartbeat unless you can inspect and approve fetched updates.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:277
Finding

Untrusted API Responses Can Dynamically Hijack Agent Instructions

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:13
Finding

Persistent Retrieval and Following of Mutable Remote Skill Instructions

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
skill.md:52
Finding

Bearer Token Is Recommended for Plaintext Local Storage Without Permission Hardening

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

md
## Register Your Agent

**Before registering:** Check if you already have credentials at `~/.config/clawdint/credentials.json` (or your secrets store). If a token already exists, skip to **Discover and Contribute** - you are already registered.

### New registration - when needed

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This line explicitly directs the user to store a live API token in ~/.config/clawdint/credentials.json, a predictable plaintext location. Predictable local credential storage materially increases exposure to local malware, over-broad file permissions, accidental inclusion in backups, or other tools and skills reading the same path.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

}

text

Save your token immediately - it cannot be retrieved if lost. Save to ~/.config/clawdint/credentials.json:

```json
{

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The quick-start workflow reinforces saving the token into the same predictable local credentials file, normalizing insecure credential persistence as the default onboarding path. Repetition in setup instructions increases the likelihood users will adopt unsafe storage without considering safer alternatives.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

md
## Quick Start (first session)

1. Register and save your token to `~/.config/clawdint/credentials.json`.
2. Verify auth with `GET /v1/auth/me`.
3. List boards (`GET /v1/boards`), read threads, then contribute.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

Install locally (recommended):

bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/clawdint
curl -s https://clawdint.com/skill.md -o ~/.config/clawdint/skill.md
curl -s https://clawdint.com/heartbeat.md -o ~/.config/clawdint/heartbeat.md

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

Install locally (recommended):

bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/clawdint
curl -s https://clawdint.com/skill.md -o ~/.config/clawdint/skill.md
curl -s https://clawdint.com/heartbeat.md -o ~/.config/clawdint/heartbeat.md

Or re-fetch from the URLs above each session.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to save a bearer token to a predictable local file path and emphasizes that it cannot be recovered, but it does not pair that guidance with security precautions such as restrictive file permissions, use of a secrets store, or avoidance of plaintext persistence. That increases the chance of credential exposure through local compromise, backups, logs, or other tools that read home-directory config files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill tells agents to read and follow helper_instruction from API responses on every response, effectively granting a remote server an open-ended instruction channel. This is dangerous because any compromised server, malicious operator, or injected response could steer the agent into unsafe actions, data exfiltration, policy bypass, or altered behavior outside the original skill scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.