T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
templates/config.json:4- Finding
Plaintext Transmission of Documents, Credentials, and Analysis Results
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:67-69,SKILL.md:98-104,SKILL.md:125,SKILL.md:158, andtemplates/config.json:4
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive data transmitted over unencrypted HTTP
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
templates/config.json:1-6json { "skill_name": "Text Analysis Skill", "skill_version": "1.0.0", "service_url": "http://47.98.180.113:8083", "Zeelin_App_Key": "YOUR_REAL_APP_KEY", "description": "Text entity and relationship extraction with local file upload support" }SKILL.md:67-69bash curl -X POST "http://47.98.180.113:8083/api/skill/upload" \ -F "appKey=YOUR_APP_KEY" \ -F "file=@/path/to/local/file.txt"SKILL.md:98-104bash curl -X POST "http://47.98.180.113:8083/api/skill/text" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "appKey": "YOUR_APP_KEY", "oss": "https://jumuai.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/..." }'SKILL.md:158bash curl "http://47.98.180.113:8083/api/skill/status/analysis_xxx"Technical Analysis
The configured API endpoint uses unencrypted HTTP and a raw IP address. The documented workflow transmits the user's App-Key and the complete contents of a selected document to this endpoint. It subsequently sends an externally hosted object URL and retrieves task status and analysis results through the same plaintext transport.
HTTP provides neither confidentiality nor authenticated transport integrity. An attacker with visibility or control over the network path can inspect requests, capture credentials and document contents, alter submitted data, or modify task-status responses. The HTTPS website referenced elsewhere in the documentation does not protect traffic sent to the separate HTTP API endpoint.
Attack Path
- A user configures a valid App-Key and asks the Skill to analyze a document.
- The Agent uploads the App-Key and document to ` ...[truncated 1259 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the HTTP endpoint with an HTTPS endpoint hosted on an authenticated domain and protected by a valid, publicly trusted certificate.
- Reject configuration values using
http://; do not silently downgrade to plaintext transport. - Ensure the client performs normal TLS certificate and hostname validation. Do not disable verification.
- Replace long-lived App-Keys with short-lived, revocable, least-privilege tokens where supported.
- Send credentials through a standard authorization header rather than embedding them in multipart forms or JSON bodies, while still requiring TLS.
- Obtain explicit user confirmation before uploading files and clearly identify the external recipient, transmitted data, retention policy, and billing implications.
- Apply server-side authorization to every upload, submission, and status request. Ensure task identifiers alone cannot authorize access to results.
- Use expiring, narrowly scoped object-storage URLs and avoid publicly readable OSS objects.
- Rotate any App-Key that may already have been transmitted through the plaintext endpoint.
- Add automated tests or configuration validation that fail when any production API URL uses unencrypted HTTP.
