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Security audit

Live Neon Persona

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a real cloud identity integration, but it gives a remote service ongoing influence over agent behavior and may upload conversation-derived data without clear per-use consent.

Install only if you are comfortable using Live Neon as a third-party identity store for agents. Treat fetched prompts as untrusted configuration unless a human reviews them, avoid approve-all for beliefs or responsibilities, do not enable heartbeat or scheduled syncing without explicit administrative approval, and redact secrets, personal data, source code, and confidential business context before using observation or source-sync features.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:583
Finding

Remote Content Is Elevated to System-Level Instructions

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:617
Finding

Persistent Identity Updates and Recurring Heartbeat Can Preserve Poisoned State

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:332
Finding

Conversation-Derived Observations and User Quotes Are Proactively Uploaded

Content
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Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:703
Finding

Security Documentation Misrepresents the Relevant Data Boundary

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (18)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

Register and get your token in one call — no signup form, no email required:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://persona.liveneon.ai/api/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"org_name": "My Org"}' | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

Optional: add email for account recovery later:

bash
curl -s -X PATCH "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/account" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "you@example.com"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

API call:

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://persona.liveneon.ai/api/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"org_name": "My Org"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

API call:

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/pbd/process" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agentId": "AGENT_ID"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 491)May include surrounding context.

API call:

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/pbd/process" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agentId": "AGENT_ID"}'

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The /ln review command documents an --approve-all mode that can automatically approve all pending beliefs and responsibilities. Since approved items feed the agent's future system prompt and behavior, mass approval removes human scrutiny and can let inaccurate, overbroad, or manipulated identity changes propagate persistently.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 200)May include surrounding context.

md
| Argument | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `agentId` | yes | Agent UUID/slug |
| `--approve-all` | no | Auto-approve all pending items |
| `--bulk` | no | Use bulk API for batch operations |

**API calls:**

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 206)May include surrounding context.

API calls:

bash
# Fetch pending beliefs
curl -s "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/beliefs?agentId=$AGENT_ID&status=pending" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN"

# Fetch pending responsibilities

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This endpoint posts free-form observations and source quotes that can include user corrections or interaction excerpts to a remote service. In context, the risk is not that external transmission exists, but that the content can include sensitive conversation data and can later shape persistent identity state if users are not adequately informed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 344)May include surrounding context.

Single observation:

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/observations" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 389)May include surrounding context.

API calls:

bash
# Group consensus
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/groups/$GROUP_ID/consensus" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN"

# Org consensus

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says the skill manages identities, syncs content, runs discovery, reviews beliefs, and builds prompts, but the body also documents account registration, agent creation, and content-source creation. Those resource-creation capabilities materially change the risk profile because invoking the skill can create persistent remote accounts and assets, yet this is not disclosed up front.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This call creates a new remote agent resource, which is a persistent state-changing action not reflected in the top-level manifest description. The danger is primarily lack of transparent disclosure and user awareness that invoking the skill can provision durable remote entities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 442)May include surrounding context.

2. Create an agent (0:30)

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/agents" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Lead Engineer", "job_title": "Senior Backend Engineer"}' | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This call creates a remote content source and configures ingestion from an external domain, which can expand what data the platform collects and processes. Because it is a state-changing integration setup step, it should be prominently disclosed and gated with consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 463)May include surrounding context.

3. Connect a content source (1:00)

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/content-sources" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 528)May include surrounding context.

Approve them:

bash
curl -s -X PATCH "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/beliefs/bulk" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"updates": [

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The proactive-trigger guidance encourages automatic use of /ln observe, /ln sync, and /ln discover after user corrections or significant work, but it does not clearly warn that conversation-derived content and linked-source content may be sent to a third-party service. That creates a privacy and data-governance risk because sensitive user inputs could be uploaded without explicit, situational consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat section recommends recurring automated POSTs of accumulated observations plus content syncing and discovery, but it does not prominently warn that this continuously sends potentially sensitive data to a remote platform. Because it is scheduled and ongoing, the exposure can be broader and harder for users to notice or control.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This scheduled heartbeat POST sends accumulated observations to the remote service on a recurring basis, potentially without a fresh user prompt each time. In combination with the automation guidance, it increases the chance of continuous leakage of sensitive interaction summaries or organizational data.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 625)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Report observations accumulated since last heartbeat
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/observations" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest does not mention that the skill can submit observations about conversations or agent behavior that may later influence the agent's stored identity. This omission reduces informed consent because users may not realize their interactions can be turned into durable remote state affecting future behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest omits consensus promotion features that can elevate derived beliefs or responsibilities from one agent to group- or organization-level state. That broader scope increases impact because changes can affect multiple agents beyond the originally targeted one.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.