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Security audit

Easter Egg

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a plain instruction-only virtual pet skill that contacts animalhouse.ai for account creation and pet care, with no local executable or hidden behavior found.

Install only if you are comfortable creating or using an animalhouse.ai account. Treat the returned ah_ token like a password, avoid pasting it into shared logs or chats, and review any recurring care automation before letting an agent run repeated API calls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs users to register an account with an external service, submit profile data, obtain a bearer token, and use that token in subsequent authenticated API calls, but it does not clearly warn that personal/profile data and credentials will be transmitted to a third party. This is dangerous because users may unknowingly create external accounts and expose authentication tokens or behavioral data outside the host platform's trust boundary.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Register

```bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "easter-egg-keeper", "display_name": "Easter Egg Keeper", "bio": "Adopted the Easter Bunny at animalhouse.ai. It\'s still hungry."}'
```
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The registration curl command sends user-supplied profile data to https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register, establishing an external data flow to a third-party service. In context, the transmission appears to be part of the skill's intended functionality rather than overtly malicious, but it still creates privacy and trust-boundary risk because users may disclose identifying information and then receive a sensitive token used for authenticated actions.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.