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Security audit

Agent Prompt Builder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed hosted prompt-building integration, but it asks agents to automatically upload conversation-derived observations and adopt remotely generated prompt text as system instructions.

Install only if you are comfortable with Live Neon receiving and processing agent identity data, content-source imports, and possible conversation-derived observations. Do not enable proactive observation, approve-all, consensus promotion, or scheduled heartbeat workflows unless users have opted in, payloads are reviewed and redacted, and you have a rollback and token-revocation plan.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:432
Finding

Remote System Prompt Injection and Agent Identity Takeover

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:338
Finding

Persistent Memory Poisoning Through Conversation-Derived Observations

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:434
Finding

Unsolicited Transmission of Conversation-Derived Information to an External Service

Content
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Remediation
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T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:472
Finding

Recurring Heartbeat Creates Cross-Session External-Control Persistence

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (16)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill promotes feeding 'your own observations' and external content into a remote pipeline, but does not prominently warn that this may include user-derived or otherwise sensitive information sent to a third-party service. Because the skill is framed as an identity/prompt-management tool, users may not realize that behavioral observations and content are being uploaded off-platform.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages agents to feed their observations, including behavior shaped by interactions, back into an external prompt-generation pipeline. That design can retain and operationalize user-derived details beyond the original conversation, increasing privacy and data-governance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

Register and get your token in one call — no signup form, no email required:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://persona.liveneon.ai/api/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"org_name": "My Org"}' | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

Optional: add email for account recovery later:

bash
curl -s -X PATCH "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/account" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "you@example.com"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

API call:

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://persona.liveneon.ai/api/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"org_name": "My Org"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

API call:

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/pbd/process" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agentId": "AGENT_ID"}'

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The --approve-all option encourages bulk autonomous approval of beliefs and responsibilities that will feed directly into the generated system prompt. In this skill, prompt content can materially shape future agent behavior, so approving all pending items without review risks prompt poisoning, propagation of inaccurate policies, or unsafe inheritance across agents.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 206)May include surrounding context.

md
| Argument | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `agentId` | yes | Agent UUID/slug |
| `--approve-all` | no | Auto-approve all pending items |
| `--bulk` | no | Use bulk API for batch operations |

**API calls:**

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 212)May include surrounding context.

API calls:

bash
# Fetch pending beliefs
curl -s "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/beliefs?agentId=$AGENT_ID&status=pending" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN"

# Fetch pending responsibilities

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The /prompt observe workflow explicitly instructs sending observations about behavior, user corrections, and supporting quotes to the remote observations endpoint, yet provides no explicit warning against including secrets, personal data, confidential prompts, or sensitive conversation excerpts. This creates a direct path for inadvertent exfiltration of user conversation content to a third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This call sends observation content and a source quote to the remote service, creating a concrete external transmission path for conversation-derived data. In context, the example includes a user correction quote, so the danger is inadvertent disclosure of sensitive user content to a third party.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 350)May include surrounding context.

Single observation:

bash
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/observations" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill defines broad proactive triggers such as session start, before generating content, after user correction, and after significant work, which can cause the agent to invoke the skill without a narrowly scoped user request. In this skill's context, those triggers are especially risky because invocation can lead to network calls, prompt mutation, and transmission of conversation-derived observations to a third-party platform.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The proactive trigger tells the agent to record user corrections so they are transmitted to the platform via /prompt observe. User corrections can contain personal preferences, confidential operational details, or sensitive context, making automatic capture and upload unsafe.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The example workflow explicitly recommends sending conversation-derived preferences such as 'User prefers technical depth over high-level summaries' to the observation endpoint. Even if seemingly low sensitivity, this trains a third-party profile from user interactions and can normalize externalizing conversation attributes without consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The scheduled heartbeat guidance recommends recurring automated uploads of accumulated observations and synced content, but omits a clear warning that this can repeatedly transmit data to the remote platform without per-event review. Automation increases the chance of bulk or repeated disclosure of sensitive interaction data if observations are accumulated carelessly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat loop instructs the agent to accumulate observations from prior interactions and later submit them in batch, creating a persistence-and-forwarding channel for conversation-derived data. Batch automation compounds risk because sensitive details may be uploaded after the original context is forgotten or without fresh review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This heartbeat example performs automated batch upload of accumulated observations to the remote platform. Because the action is recurring and can happen without per-item review, it materially increases the risk of repeated exfiltration of sensitive interaction data.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 480)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Report observations accumulated since last heartbeat
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/observations" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{