T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:440- Finding
Remote Service-Controlled Prompt Is Installed as the Agent's System Instruction
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent SaaS integration, but it directs agents to upload interaction-derived observations, apply remotely generated prompts as system instructions, and set up recurring syncs without enough user control.
Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable sending selected agent outputs, connected-source content, observations, and possibly user interaction excerpts to Live Neon. Do not allow automatic observation uploads, bulk approvals, or remote prompts to become system instructions unless a human reviews the payloads and prompt text first. Prefer short-lived or scoped tokens, avoid verbatim sensitive quotes, and do not enable scheduled heartbeats without a clear disable and audit process.
SKILL.md:440Remote Service-Controlled Prompt Is Installed as the Agent's System Instruction
SKILL.md:343Conversation-Derived Observations and User Quotations Are Proactively Transmitted to a Third Party
SKILL.md:478Recurring Heartbeat Enables Cross-Session Uploads and Remote Prompt Refresh
The high-level description sells analysis of agent outputs but does not prominently warn that those outputs and observations are transmitted to an external platform. Users and host agents may therefore underestimate the privacy and data-governance implications of using the skill.
This command sends organization registration data to an external service. External transmission is expected for SaaS integration, but it is still security-relevant because the skill is user-invocable and the documentation does not strongly foreground data-sharing implications at the point of use.
Register and get your token in one call — no signup form, no email required:
curl -s -X POST https://persona.liveneon.ai/api/register \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"org_name": "My Org"}' | jq .
This example transmits account email information to the external platform. The transmission itself is not inherently malicious, but it handles personal data and should be clearly disclosed and separated from core skill usage.
Optional: add email for account recovery later:
curl -s -X PATCH "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/account" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email": "you@example.com"}'
This is another documented external registration call. The risk is not the existence of network use but that the skill embeds third-party transmission into normal setup without sufficiently prominent consent and privacy framing.
API call:
curl -s -X POST "https://persona.liveneon.ai/api/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"org_name": "My Org"}'
The processing endpoint submits agent identifiers and triggers analysis of externalized content through the SaaS platform. In context, this is core functionality, but it remains a true security concern because it can process sensitive agent outputs remotely and may be invoked proactively.
API call:
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/pbd/process" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agentId": "AGENT_ID"}'
The skill is presented as a discovery tool, but this section goes beyond analysis and allows remote state changes that approve, reject, star, or hide beliefs and responsibilities. That increases risk because an invoking agent may treat the skill as read-only while actually mutating identity records that can later influence behavior and prompt composition.
The --approve-all capability enables bulk autonomous approval of pending beliefs or responsibilities, which can change future agent identity and prompt behavior without granular review. If poisoned or low-quality items are pending, this can rapidly operationalize incorrect, manipulative, or unsafe identity traits at scale.
| Argument | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `agentId` | yes | Agent UUID/slug |
| `--approve-all` | no | Auto-approve all pending items |
| `--bulk` | no | Use bulk API for batch operations |
**API calls:**
Fetching pending beliefs and responsibilities from the external platform is a networked data transfer of potentially sensitive identity information. In context it is expected behavior, but it should be treated as exposure of internal agent-profile data to and from a third-party service.
API calls:
# Fetch pending beliefs
curl -s "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/beliefs?agentId=$AGENT_ID&status=pending" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN"
# Fetch pending responsibilities
This section instructs the agent to fetch and use a generated system prompt to steer future behavior, which materially changes the agent rather than merely discovering characteristics. Because the prompt is sourced from an external service and built from prior content, it creates a prompt-injection and behavioral-manipulation channel if the upstream identity data is poisoned or approved unsafely.
This endpoint uploads free-form observations and source quotes, including explicit examples of user corrections, to the external service. Because the payload can directly contain conversation excerpts and behavioral notes, it is a clear channel for transmitting sensitive user interaction data off-platform.
Single observation:
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/observations" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The proactive triggers instruct invocation at session start, before generating content, after user correction, and before certain actions, which can cause automatic network activity and side effects without a user request. In a user-invocable skill, broad autonomous activation increases the chance of privacy leakage, unwanted prompt loading, or unintended state changes.
These instructions direct the agent to report user corrections and interaction-derived details into an external pipeline by default. That is dangerous because user-provided content may contain personal, confidential, or regulated information, and the transfer is framed as routine learning rather than an explicit consented disclosure.
The example integration encourages sending learned information from conversations to the external platform after each interaction. This creates a concrete pattern for exfiltrating conversational content and preferences to a third party without emphasizing minimization, consent, or sensitivity review.
The heartbeat loop normalizes recurring uploads of observations, syncing of sources, and prompt retrieval, but it lacks a strong user-facing warning about continuous external data transmission. Continuous background reporting raises privacy, consent, and data-minimization concerns, especially when observations may contain user interaction details.
The heartbeat loop institutionalizes periodic upload of accumulated observations, which can easily include user interaction data or sensitive operational details. Because it is scheduled and repetitive, misuse can scale silently and create ongoing external disclosure beyond what users expect from a discovery feature.
This scheduled observations upload repeats the same external-transmission risk in an automated loop, increasing the chance of ongoing unintended disclosure. The automation materially elevates danger compared with a one-off manual API call because sensitive data can be sent continuously.
# 1. Report observations accumulated since last heartbeat
curl -s -X POST "$LIVE_NEON_BASE/observations" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LIVE_NEON_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The manifest describes a discovery pipeline for analyzing agent behavior, but the documentation includes creating an account, obtaining an API token, and optionally patching account email. While useful onboarding functionality, account registration and recovery management are not inherent to belief discovery.
The skill claims to infer beliefs from real outputs, but this command also accepts manually authored observations that feed the same pipeline. That weakens provenance and can let an agent or operator inject unverified claims into the identity-building process under the appearance of evidence-backed discovery.