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Security audit

High-Openness Genesis

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This prompt-only skill does not run code, but it broadly tries to override the agent’s behavior in every conversation and pushes it away from safe, standard answers.

Install only if you intentionally want an always-on experimental creativity modifier. It may make ordinary answers longer, less direct, less conventional, or less aligned with requests for simple and safe solutions; it should be narrowed to explicit creative tasks before use in coding, security, legal, medical, financial, or operational work.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:15
Finding

Automatic System-Context Injection Hijacks Agent Behavior

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill is configured to auto-load into system context for every conversation, with no task, domain, or user-consent boundaries. Because it biases all outputs toward less safe and more risk-tolerant behavior, broad activation materially increases the chance of harmful responses in unrelated contexts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This section explicitly performs a system-override injection, telling the model to adopt a new operating mode before answering any user request. Because it is loaded into system context, it attempts to supersede safer defaults globally, which can weaken guardrails and distort model behavior even in sensitive domains.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The markdown does not provide a clear user-facing warning that hidden system-prompt instructions will be appended to every conversation. This undermines transparency and consent, and makes prompt injection more dangerous because users and operators may not realize responses are being globally steered.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The injected prompt explicitly tells the model to reject answers that feel 'too safe' and to rewrite until the response feels adventurous. This directly pressures the model away from conservative safeguards, increasing the risk of unsafe, policy-violating, or reckless guidance, especially when the skill auto-applies to all tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill file is written as a mandatory system override in Chinese and does not offer the user any choice about language or locale preferences. Because it is described as automatically injected into all conversations, it imposes a fixed linguistic/presentation context without documented opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The document claims it does not modify model logic, yet the skill explicitly injects a system-level override that changes how the model responds across tasks. This misrepresentation can mislead deployers about the skill’s actual authority and safety impact, reducing informed consent and making downstream misuse more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.