Back to skill

Security audit

Skill Creator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent AgentSkill authoring helper; it can create, edit, validate, and package skill files, but I found no hidden execution, exfiltration, or deceptive behavior.

Install this only if you want an agent to help create or modify AgentSkill packages. Review generated skill changes before using or publishing them, and be careful when adding real secrets, persistent memory, or hooks to any skill this tool helps author.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (16)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The reported behavior expansion into packaging and test-like/archive-handling workflows exceeds the declared review/editing purpose and can expose filesystem/archive behaviors not obvious from the trigger text. Even if some of the static-analysis wording references related files or inferred capabilities, the core issue remains that the skill's activation criteria are broader than its stated side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The reported behavior expansion into packaging and test-like/archive-handling workflows exceeds the declared review/editing purpose and can expose filesystem/archive behaviors not obvious from the trigger text. Even if some of the static-analysis wording references related files or inferred capabilities, the core issue remains that the skill's activation criteria are broader than its stated side effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly guides writing and modifying SKILL.md and restructuring skill contents, which is a self-modification capability when used within a live agent-skill environment. Self-modifying instructions are high risk because they can alter future agent behavior, broaden triggers, or smuggle in unsafe tool guidance that persists beyond the current session.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

md
- Specific triggers/contexts for when to use it
- Concrete examples of user requests that should activate it

#### Write SKILL.md Body

Keep under 500 lines. Use references/ for detailed content.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/init_skill.py (reported line 307)May include surrounding context.

python
# Print next steps
    print(f"\n[OK] Skill '{skill_name}' initialized successfully at {skill_dir}")
    print("\nNext steps:")
    print("1. Edit SKILL.md to complete the TODO items and update the description")
    if resources:
        if include_examples:
            print("2. Customize or delete the example files in scripts/, references/, and assets/")

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_package_skill.py (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

python
def test_skips_symlink_to_external_file(self):
        skill_dir = self.create_skill("symlink-file-skill")
        outside = self.temp_dir / "outside-secret.txt"
        outside.write_text("super-secret\n")
        link = skill_dir / "loot.txt"
        out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_package_skill.py (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

python
def test_skips_symlink_to_external_file(self):
        skill_dir = self.create_skill("symlink-file-skill")
        outside = self.temp_dir / "outside-secret.txt"
        outside.write_text("super-secret\n")
        link = skill_dir / "loot.txt"
        out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_package_skill.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
def test_skips_symlink_to_external_file(self):
        skill_dir = self.create_skill("symlink-file-skill")
        outside = self.temp_dir / "outside-secret.txt"
        outside.write_text("super-secret\n")
        link = skill_dir / "loot.txt"
        out_dir = self.temp_dir / "out"

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of scripts, packaging, filesystem operations, and hook examples, implying meaningful file and execution capabilities, but it declares no explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. Without a declared scope, an agent may invoke broader tools than necessary when this skill triggers, increasing the blast radius of misuse or prompt-triggered overreach.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
---
version: "1.2.0"
name: skill-creator
description: Create, edit, improve, or audit AgentSkills. Use when creating a new skill from scratch or when asked to improve, review, audit, tidy up, or clean up an existing skill or SKILL.md file. Also use when editing or restructuring a skill directory (moving files to references/ or scripts/, removing stale content, validating against the AgentSkills spec). Triggers on phrases like "create a skill", "author a skill", "tidy up a skill", "improve this skill", "review the skill", "clean up the skill", "audit the skill".
---

# Skill Creator

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad and generic, such as 'improve this skill' or 'review the skill,' making accidental or overly frequent activation likely. Over-broad activation is dangerous here because the skill includes guidance for editing files, packaging outputs, and restructuring directories, which can steer an agent into side-effectful operations without sufficiently specific user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 188)May include surrounding context.

md
### Option 1: Check into Repository

For small teams, check skills into the repo (e.g., `./skills/` or `./.claude/skills`).

### Option 2: Plugin Marketplace

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/output-patterns.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Create SKILL.md with template
cat > skills/my-new-skill/SKILL.md << 'EOF'
---
name: my-new-skill
description: [description]

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The trigger example "help me plan" is broad and can appear in ordinary conversation, which increases the chance that this skill activates when the user did not intend to invoke a structured multi-phase planning workflow. In a skill-creation context, overly broad activation can cause incorrect routing, unnecessary file access, or unintended modification/audit behavior across unrelated requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The manifest frames this skill as guidance for creating, improving, and auditing AgentSkills. The 'Memory & Storing Data' section introduces persistent data storage in locations like ~/.my-skill/data.json or ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}, which is a broader operational capability not necessary for the core purpose of authoring or restructuring skill files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a skill for creating, editing, improving, and auditing AgentSkills. The 'On Demand Hooks' section goes further by specifying runtime control behaviors such as blocking commands and restricting edits, which are capabilities of deployed skills rather than necessary functionality for authoring them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

A skill whose declared role is to create or audit AgentSkills does not inherently need to handle secrets-oriented configuration patterns. Recommending config files containing api_key and notification destinations expands into operational integration guidance that is not clearly covered by the manifest's narrower authoring-focused purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.