T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:35- Finding
Unpinned External Dependency Installer
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 35–36
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency with immediate installer execution
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippet:
bash git clone https://github.com/LittleLollipop/lobster-memory.git cd lobster-memory && bash install.shTechnical Analysis
The documented installation procedure clones the mutable default branch of an external Git repository and immediately executes its
install.shscript. It does not pin a reviewed release tag or commit hash, nor does it require verification through a cryptographic checksum or signature.Consequently, the code executed by users can change after this skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the upstream repository, its maintainer account, or its release process could introduce arbitrary commands into the installer. This is an unsafe software supply-chain practice even though the audit found no evidence that the currently referenced project is malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or another mechanism capable of modifying its default branch.
- The attacker adds malicious commands to
install.shor code invoked by that script. - A user follows the instructions in
SKILL.mdand clones the repository without selecting a fixed, previously reviewed commit. - The shell executes the attacker-controlled
install.sh. - The payload runs with the permissions of the user performing the installation.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's permissions and the commands used to run the installer, the attacker could access or alter user-readable files, steal credentials available to the process, modify development or WorkBuddy configuration, install additional software, or compromise stored memory data.
The direct privilege l ...[truncated 280 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Pin installation to a specific, reviewed commit hash or immutable signed release instead of the mutable default branch.
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Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or signature for the expected source archive and installer before execution.
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Replace the clone-and-run instructions with a procedure similar to:
bash git clone https://github.com/LittleLollipop/lobster-memory.git cd lobster-memory git checkout --detach EXPECTED_COMMIT_HASH test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "EXPECTED_COMMIT_HASH" # Verify the documented signature or checksum here. less install.sh bash install.sh -
Document the expected commit, checksum, signer identity, and verification failure behavior.
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Recommend running installation with ordinary user privileges in an isolated environment and explicitly warn users not to invoke the installer with
sudo. -
Review dependency lock files and transitive dependencies in the external engine before updating the pinned revision.
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