Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md - `references/international-search.md` - International search guide
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a documented search-engine helper; its main risk is that user queries are sent to external search providers, which is expected for its purpose.
Install only if you are comfortable with the agent sending search terms to the selected external search provider. Avoid using it for secrets, credentials, private URLs, personal data, or confidential project names, and use safe-search defaults unless you deliberately need otherwise.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- `references/international-search.md` - International search guide
The changelog documents direct use of external search engines and includes executable-style examples that send user queries to third-party services, but it does not warn that search terms may contain sensitive data and will be disclosed to external providers. In a search-integration skill, this omission can lead users or downstream agents to transmit secrets, internal URLs, or personal information without informed consent, especially across multiple providers with different privacy practices.
The skill explicitly encourages sending arbitrary user queries to multiple third-party search engines through direct web requests, but it does not warn users that their search terms will be transmitted to external services. This can expose sensitive prompts, internal project names, credentials accidentally pasted into queries, or behavioral metadata to providers with different privacy practices, which is especially relevant because the skill advertises privacy features while also including many non-private engines.
This manifest includes multiple CN-region search providers and explicitly labels them with the "cn" region, but the file provides no natural-language indication that users can choose or opt into this locale-specific behavior. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern even in configuration values.
The document explicitly documents and demonstrates DuckDuckGo's kp=-1 parameter, which disables safe search, but provides no warning about adult, graphic, or otherwise unsafe results. In a reusable agent skill, this can normalize unsafe defaults or be copied into automated workflows, increasing the chance of exposing users to harmful or policy-violating content.
The Startpage parameter table includes nj=0 to disable the family filter without any warning or guardrails. Because this file is an operational search guide for agents, documenting the filter-bypass parameter can directly enable unsafe searches and increase exposure to explicit or harmful material.
The natural-language documentation is written in Chinese and does not indicate that this is a China-specific or Chinese-only skill, nor does it offer an alternative language or opt-in. This can conflict with language/locale policy expectations when users are not given a choice.
The documentation includes locale-specific examples such as converting USD to CNY and weather in Beijing, alongside CN-specific engines, which can signal a default regional orientation. There is no statement that the user can choose locale/region behavior or that the China-focused context is intentional and limited.
The file presents all instructions and examples only in Chinese, which can amount to a language policy issue when no user opt-in or justification for the locale restriction is provided. The content includes many general-purpose search instructions, so the monolingual presentation appears to be a default rather than a clearly documented regional constraint.
No suspicious patterns detected.